


INSIDE COMMUNIST SLAVE-EMPIRE
SERIES No. 3.

CHINA IS RED

with

PEASANTS' BLOOD



by
SITARAM GOEL

SOCIETY FOR DEFENCE OF FREEDOM IN ASIA

CHINA IS RED
WITH
PEASANTS' BLOOD

BY
SITA RAM GOEL

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DEDICATED

TO

THE INDIAN PEASANTS

Amongst whom I spent twenty-two years of
my life, with a prayer that they should
escape the doom which parasitic and
self-righteous bookworms and
politicians of the cities
plan for them.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I am grateful, firstly, to my friend Ram Swarup whose study of the peasant problem under Communism aroused me from my dogmatic slumbers, and secondly, to my friend Gauri Shanker Mohta without whose painstaking research into Chinese Communist literature this study would not have been possible.

S. R. G.

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INTRODUCTION

Stories have been afloat for long, as a result of irresponsible reports by globe-trotting Western journalists, particularly American, that the Chinese Reds are not communists like their Russian namesakes but only a band of *radical agrarian reformers*. The point was referred to Chou-En-lai by one reporter in 1945 and the reply was: “we do not mind what the sons-of bitches believe about us so long as the belief helps our revolution.” A study of the Chinese Communist documents and the history of their struggle to power leaves no doubt that they are followers of Stalin in both letter and spirit and their tactics towards the peasantry have all been dictated by the Leninists-Stalinist theory and practice on the subject.

Knowing the peasant’s deep-seated longing to own the land they till, the Chinese Communists accepted Sun Yat Sen’s slogan of “land to the tiller”, to rally the peasants round their party, especially after the break with the Kuomintang in 1927. They directed the peasants everywhere to kill the landlords and seize the land, as did the Bolsheviks in Russia in 1917. During the war with Japan, the communists had to pursue “United Front” tactics and they gave up their drastic land distribution programme in favour of moderate demands for rent reductions etc., even in the areas of the North, solidly under their control. But they returned to the old policy of peasant uprisings after the Second World War and intensified the civil war between landlords and peasants

in the whole countryside. The support received from the peasants was one of the factors in their victory over the Kuomintang armies in the final showdown. And now that the communists are securely saddled in power the shift towards urban areas and against the peasants is quite clear to those who regularly read the Chinese publications and press and who understand the technical jargon in which the communists talk.

The aim of the Chinese communists is to collectivise their agriculture after the Russian pattern. According to an article written by Wu Chuah-nung, Vice-Minister of Agriculture, in *People's China* of November 1951 :

“The new development of Chinese agriculture may be divided into three stages. The first, now largely completed, is the land-reforms. The second the present stage, is the organisation of agricultural production through mutual aid teams and agricultural producers' cooperatives. This is the stepping stone to the third stage, which still lies in the future: *collectivisation of agriculture on a nation-wide scale on the pattern of collective farming in the Soviet Union.*”

“The increasingly numerous mutual aid teams and agricultural producers' cooperatives in China, which are still based on private property but organize the peasants for labour in common, thus represent a development of the profoundest historic development. They are helping to lay the ground work for the gradual transformation of the individual economy of millions of small cultivators into the large scale collective production of a mechanized agriculture. The mutual aid teams and other forms of agricultural cooperation which now exist are training the personnel which will make this future. *It is possible that the leaders of the present mutual aid teams and agricultural cooperatives may become Chairmen of collective farms or superintendents of state farms in the future.*”

We can now believe that the much-advertised and much applauded “land-reform” in China is, for the

Chinese communists, only a milestone on a road at the end of which we have the collectivization and mechanization of agriculture on the Soviet Russian model. From the peasants' point of view, collectivisation is the exact opposite of land-reform. Land-reform means that the individual peasants come to own they till; but collectivisation on the Russian pattern means losing the land again and becoming a hired labourer on the land for piece-wages, determined by bureaucratic bosses after their fat salaries, equipment expenses and state taxes have been paid from that total produce. The intellectual who mostly manipulates certain linguistic symbols while discussing concrete social and economic problems, may not understand the peasant's resistance to collectivisation and mechanisation; but the peasant upon whom the whip lashes directly knows instinctively and experiences physically the doom which collectivisation promises him.

The peasants in Russia offered tremendous resistance to collectivisation and millions of peasants had to be killed, deported and liquidated in other ways before the Russian countryside could be integrated into the "Socialist" economy of Soviet Russia between 1929-34. Millions more died in the famine which followed forced collectivisation and it is estimated by scholars who have studied relevant statistics that nearly 22 million peasants perished within a span of five years. In fact, the communists plan and wage a complicated civil war, which first outstrips the scale and ruthlessness of the initial civil war which first brings the communists to power. The technique of collectivisation has been perfected after being applied in Russia and East European countries, and the Chinese peasants are fated to lose in the struggle unless China breaks away from Stalinism and strikes her own path like Yugoslavia.

There could perhaps be some economic justification for mechanization of agriculture in a country like Russia where the land is extensive and population comparatively small. But in a country like China where the pressure of population on land is about ten times larger than in Russia, mechanisation of agriculture can have only an ideological, and no economic, justification. If we imagine the human cost which collectivisation would inevitably and inescapably impose upon China, we can feel within ourselves the horror which communism must bring in the lives of the mute millions of agrarian Asia. Some 38 million Chinese peasants—15 million “landlords” and 23 million “rich peasants”—are to be liquidated as “reactionary” classes. Liquidation means physical death for many, confiscation of property for everybody and forced-labour in concentration camps for the great majority.

I

RAW MATERIAL OF REVOLUTION

Lenin had divided the communist “revolution” into two stages—the “bourgeois-democratic “revolution” and the “socialist or proletarian” revolution”. Stalin quotes Lenin in his main theoretical work:

“The proletariat¹ must carry to completion the democratic revolution, by allying to itself the mass of the peasantry in order to crush by force the resistance of the autocracy and to paralyse the instability of the bourgeoisie.²

“The proletariat must accomplish the Socialist revolution by allying to itself the mass of the semiproletarian elements of the population in order to crush by force the resistance of the bourgeoisie and *to paralyse the instability of the peasantry and the petty-bourgeoisie.*”³

Lenin, who was brutally frank, laid down his fundamental approach to the peasantry in the following passage:

-
1. No one should confuse this word with the word “worker”. In communist parlance, the words “proletariat” and “working class” refer to those people who follow the Comintern alias Cominform line, irrespective of whether they are landlords, capitalists or other non-working class people.
 2. Problems of Leninism, Page 69, Foreign Language Publishing House, Moscow, 1947.
 3. Ibid, Page 69.

“At first we support the peasantry in general against the land-lords, support it to the end and by all means, including confiscation and then (or rather, not ‘then’ but at the same time) we *support the proletariat against the peasantry in general*. To try now to calculate what the combination of forces will be within the peasantry on the ‘morrow’ of the revolution (the democratic revolution) is sheer utopia. Without descending to adventurism or going against our scientific conscience, without striving for cheap popularity, we can and do say only one thing. We shall put every effort into assisting the entire peasantry to make the democratic revolution in order thereby *to make it easier for us, the Party of the Proletariat, to pass on as quickly as possible, to the new and higher task—the Socialist Revolution*. We hold forth no promises of harmony, equalisation or ‘socialisation’ as a result of the victory of the present peasant uprising—on the contrary we ‘promise’ a new struggle, a new inequality, a new revolution towards which we are striving.”¹

Mao Tse-tung accepts these fundamental formulations. He wrote in 1940 :

“The historical process of the Chinese revolution must be divided into two stages : first the democratic revolution and then the Socialist revolution—two revolutionary process quite different in character.”²

And there is a historical background for this formulation in the history of the Communist Party of China ever since it came into existence as a “section of the Communist International” founded by Lenin and controlled by Stalin. *The Manifesto of the Second National Congress of the Communist Party of China* adopted in July 1922 declared :

“The CCP is the party of the proletariat. Its aims are to organise the proletariat and to struggle

1. Lenin, Selected Works, Page 442, Moscow, 1947.

2. China’s New Democracy, Page 3, People’s Publishing House Ltd., Bombay, 1950.

for (the establishment of) the dictatorship of the workers and peasants, the abolition of private property and the gradual attainment of a communist society. At present the CCP must, in the interest of the workers and poor peasants, lead the workers to support the democratic revolution and forge a democratic *united front* of workers, poor peasants, and petty bourgeoisie.”¹

In an earlier para the Manifesto defined the two-stages more clearly:

“The proletariat’s support of the democratic revolution is not (equivalent to) its surrender to the capitalists. Not to prolong the life of the feudal system is absolutely necessary in order to raise the power of the proletariat. This is the proletariat’s own class interest. It would be no liberation for the proletariat if a successful democratic revolution brought it only some minor liberties and rights. The successful democratic revolution develops the capitalist class, at present in its infancy—capitalist opposition to the proletariat being left to the future. When that stage is reached, *the proletariat must launch the struggle of the second phase* : (the struggle) for the dictatorship of the proletariat allied to the poor peasants against the bourgeoisie.”²

Mao Tse-tung emphasised the importance of peasant support in his *Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan* submitted to the Party in February 1927: He wrote:

“The further development of the peasant movement is a tremendous problem. Within a short time, hundreds of millions of peasants will rise in Central, South and North China, with the fury of a hurricane; no power, however strong, can restrain them. They will break all the shackles that bind them

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1. A Documentary History of Chinese Communism by Brandit, Schwartz & Fairbank, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., Page 64. London, 1952.
 2. Ibid, Pages 63-64

and rush towards the road of liberation. *All imperialist, warlords, corrupt officials, and bad gentry will meet their doom at the hands of the peasants* (underlining in original). All revolutionary parties and comrades will be judged by them. *Are we to get in front of them and lead them or criticize them behind their backs or fight them from the opposite camp?* Among these three alternatives every Chinese can choose freely.”¹

In the same document he assigned the role of the “vanguard” to the peasantry in the first revolution, when he wrote:

“This multitudinous mass of poor peasants is the core of the Peasant Associations, the vanguard in the overthrowing of feudal forces, accomplishing the not-yet-accomplished revolutionary mission. Without the poor peasants class (in the words of the gentry: without the *p'i-tzu*), no revolutionary conditions would exist as they do now in rural areas; and the *t'u-bao* and bad gentry could never be overthrown to complete and bad gentry could never be overthrown to complete the democratic revolution.”²

He was corrected by the *Resolution of the Fifth National Congress of CCP* in May 1927 which asserted that the “vanguard” can be only the proletariat. The resolution stated:

“The agrarian revolution, the destruction of feudalism, are prime pre-requisites for the establishment of democracy. In the normal evolution of human society the bourgeoisie generally liberates the peasantry from the shackles of feudalism. In China, however, due to the intervention of imperialism, the bourgeoisie has been unable to develop enough strength to resist the feudal system. In view of these

1. Ibid, Page 80

2. Ibid, Page 88

facts, the peasantry must seek its allies, in its struggle against feudalism and its supporters, among the petty-bourgeoisie and the proletariat. It must be *led by the proletariat* and supported by the petty bourgeoisie.”¹

But the Resolution recognised the crucial role of the peasantry in the following words:

“Our experience in Kwantung, Hunan, Hupeh, other provinces has demonstrated that the peasant movement must be based primarily on the poor peasants (tenants, semi-tenants, and small landholders) and must be organised by them. At the present stage the basic aims of movement must be destruction of patriarchal, feudal power, and the establishment of peasant government in the villages. Hence, in this struggle, *the problem of arming the peasants is of crucial importance.*”²

Confessing their errors after being rebuked by the Comintern for not following the policy of peasant uprisings the Central Committee of the Party reiterated in a *Circular Letter to all Party Members*, that:

“The question of agrarian revolution is the crux of the bourgeois-democratic revolution in China. The CI³ has repeatedly explained itself concerning this question. The CI gave clear and definite instructions to our Chinese Party indicating ways of solving the land problem (in China). The resolution of the Eighth Plenum of the ECCI⁴ (May 1927) also reiterated the previous directives (of the CI). The resolution pointed out; ‘Only by relying on the agrarian revolution in the rural areas and by satisfying the needs of the urban working class and guaranteeing their political rights can the masses be brought into to the struggle.’ Agrarian revolution consists of *confiscation and nationalization of land*—this is the major

1. Ibid, Page 95

2. Ibid, Page 96

3. Communist International.

4. Executive Committee of the Communist International.

content of the internal social economy in the new stage of the Chinese revolution. The main thing at present is to employ the “mass-type” revolutionary methods to solve the land problem (and allow) *the tens of millions of peasants to solve this problem by rising from below*. The CCP¹ should be the vanguard of this movement and direct it.”²

Their belief in the “two-stage theory” was however intact when the *Political Resolution of the Sixth National Congress of the Communist Party of China*, held in Moscow in September 1928, devoted a chapter to a discussion of “*The Source of Power to the Chinese Revolution and its Transition of a Socialist Future*”. We reproduce the chapter;

“(1) *The Chinese revolution has a socialist future.*

“*The proletariat and the peasantry now constitute the sole source of power of the Chinese revolution, and the leadership of the proletariat has already been established in the stage of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. (The proletariat can support and guide the peasantry in the agrarian revolution and the struggle against the imperialists.) This will therefore open the path of the Chinese revolution towards a non-capitalist, that is, socialist future.*

“(2) *The transformation of the democratic into a socialist revolution is determined by the strength (li-liang) of the struggle.*

“World capitalism is at present in a frightened state of depression. There have been ten years of socialist construction in a country under proletarian dictatorship, the Soviet Union, whose political and economic power is growing ; this will help the Chinese proletariat to win the revolution for a socialist future, and guarantee its victory.

1. Chinese Communist party.

2. A Documentary History of Chinese Communism by Brandt, Schwartz and Fairbank, page 109.

“At the same time, *the democratic dictatorship of workers and peasants in the form of Soviet rule will be the starting point of transformation to the dictatorship of the proletariat. Only the struggle, the strength, the solidarity and organisational strength of the proletariat and only the comparative ratio of class strength can decide when the bourgeois-democratic stage of the revolution will end*, how it will be transformed into process of socialist revolution of the proletariat.”¹

That the Chinese Communists made political capital out of famine conditions becomes clear from the *Circular* No. 40 of the Central Committee of the Party issued on July 9, 1929. It instructed :

“We must strengthen our leadership of the peasant movement and carry on our activities in a well-planned way. In the present stage of the rural struggle, it is *still a mistake to oppose rich peasants unconditionally*. Nevertheless the class struggle of hired farm hands and poor peasants against the rich peasants should not be relaxed. Special attention should be paid to the organization of hired farm hands. *As a result of the present famine in China, especially in North China, objectively speaking there is a great possibility for the flourishing of the peasant struggle.*”²

When the foreign policy of the Soviet Union dictated a “United Front” to the Chinese Communists they changed over from “agrarian revolution” to “reformism” They adopted Mao Tse-tung’s *Ten-point Programme for National Salvation and Resistance to Japan* at a conference held in Lochuan in August 1937. According to official history :

“The Lochuan Conference decided to fight for the people’s own political and economic rights on condition that by doing so the mobilisation of the

1. Ibid, pages 132-33.

2. Ibid, Pages 172-73.

people throughout the country for participation in the war was facilitated. It also decided that the fundamental policy to be followed in solving the peasant problem during the War should be to reduce rents and interests.”¹

This reformism advanced further in 1942 when the destruction of Soviet Russia by a combined German-Japanese effort became a practical possibility and the Communist Party of China made fresh overtures to the Kuomintang after having betrayed the “United Front” during the Hitler-Stalin Pact. *Decisions of the CCP on Land Policy in the Anti-Japanese Base Areas* adopted on January 28, 1942 included the following points:

“(1) Recognize that peasants (including hired farm hands) constitute the basic strength of the anti-Japanese war as well as the battle of production. Accordingly, it is the policy of the Party to assist the peasants, reduce feudal exploitation by the landlords, carry out reductions of rent and interest rates and guarantee the civil liberties, political rights, land rights and economic rights of the peasants, in order to improve their living conditions and enhance their enthusiasm for the anti-Japanese war and for production.

“(2) *Recognize that most of the landlords are anti-Japanese, that some of the enlightened gentry also favour democratic reforms.* Accordingly, the policy of the Party is only to help the peasants in *reducing feudal exploitation but not to liquidate feudal exploitation entirely*, much less to attack the enlightened gentry who support democratic reforms. Therefore, after rent and interest rates are reduced, the collection of rent and interest are to be assured; and in addition to protecting the civil liberties, political, land and economic rights of the peasants, *we must guarantee the landlords their civil liberties, political, land, and economic*

1. Thirty Years of the Communist Party of China, Page 49 Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1951.

rights in order to ally the landlord class with us in the struggle against the Japanese. The policy of liquidating feudal exploitation should only be adopted against stubbornly unrepentant traitors.¹

“(10) The task of the Peasant Association for National Salvation, in the matter of rent and interest rate reduction, is mainly to *assist the government in carrying out the laws concerning the reductions of rent and interest rates*. After the rent and interest rates have been reduced, its major task is to assist the government in mediating rural disputes and increasing agricultural production. It shall not, however, substitute its own decisions for government laws and orders, nor take the pace of the administration. In its task of settling rural disputes, methods of mediation, rather than that of arbitrary decision, should be used. In the task of developing agricultural production, all members of the peasant associations should be mobilized to become models and leaders.”²

Mao Tse-tung returned to Communist “leadership” of the peasantry in 1945, and clearly stated the “raw material theory” in his *On Coalition Government* published on April 24, 1945. He wrote:

“As there is no political party in China representing exclusively the peasant class, and as political parties representing the liberal bourgeoisie lack a resolute agrarian policy, the Chinese communists who have a firm land programme and who really fight for the interest of the peasants, securing the broadest masses as their allies, as a result have become the leaders of the peasants and all revolutionary democrats.

“The peasants are predecessors of the Chinese workers, and millions of them in future will go to the cities and into factories. If China needs to build up a powerful national industry and many modern cities,

1. A Documentary History of Chinese Communism by Brandt, Schwartz & Fairbank, Page 270, Georg Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1952.

2. Ibid, Page 280.

then she has to undergo the lengthy process of transforming the rural population into an urban population.

“The peasants are a market for China’s industry. They along can supply it with the richest food and raw materials, and absorb the vast quantities of industrial products.

“The peasants are the source of our armies. The soldiers are peasants in military uniform. They are the mortal enemies of the Japanese aggressors.

“The peasants, *at the present stage*, are the main foundation of democracy in China. Chinese democrats can achieve nothing if they do not rely on the 360,000,000 peasants for support.

“The peasants, *at the present stage*, are the main foundation of China’s cultural movement. Divorced from the 360,000,000 peasants, are not the illiteracy elimination campaigns, the universal education, the popular literature, and the national health campaigns all empty phrases?

“I said ‘main foundation’ because naturally I would not ignore the political, economic, and cultural importance of the remaining 90,000,000 people, particularly the *working class, politically the most conscious of all classes of the Chinese people and able to lead all democratic movements. This must not be misunderstood.*

“To understand all this thoroughly is necessary not only for the Chinese Communists, but for all democratic groups as well.”¹

After the failure of “coalition” talks with the Kuomintang in 1947 the communists re-invoked their old, pre-Japanese-war policy of peasant insurrections. According to the official history:

1. Ibid, Pages 309-10.

“On October 10, 1947, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army issued a declaration, calling upon all the Chinese people to overthrow Chiang Kai-shek and build a New China. To satisfy the peasants’ age-old desire for land, the Chinese Communist Party on the same day made public the *Basic Programme of the Chinese Agrarian Law* providing for the abolition of the old land ownership system based upon feudal exploitation and for the institution of a new system of giving land to the tillers. The carrying out of land reform fully *aroused the peasants* in the Liberated Areas where the *landlords were liquidated* as a class, thus, greatly consolidating the Liberated Areas and greatly facilitating the People’s Liberation War.”¹

Having won the civil war, Mao Tse-tung announced the basic Leninist-Stalinist attitude towards peasantry. In March 1949, the Chinese Communist leaders met at Shihchiachuang, with Mao Tse-tung presiding over the deliberations. According to the *New China News Agency*:

“The plenary session laid stress on discussion of the question of *shifting the centre of gravity of party-work under the present situation from the rural areas to the cities*. It pointed that since the failure of the great revolution in 1927—the centre of gravity of Chinese people’s revolutionary struggle has been in the countryside, gathering forces in the countryside, *using them to encircle the cities* and then taking the cities.....History has proved that this policy is fully necessary, entirely correct, and also entirely successful. But the period of this way of working is now ended. *From now on, a new period of leading rural areas by the cities* begins. The countryside must certainly not be cast aside, but the centre of gravity of Party work must be placed on the cities from now on.”

Writing to commemorate the 28th Anniversary of the Communist Party of China on July 1, 1949. Mao stated:

1. Thirty Years of the Communist Party of China, Page 72, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1951.

“Our present task is to strengthen the people’s state apparatus—meaning principally the people’s *army*, the people’s police and the people’s *courts*—thereby safeguarding national defence and protecting the people’s interests. Given these conditions, China, under the leadership of the working class and the Communist Party can develop steadily from an agricultural into an industrial country and from a New Democratic into a Socialist and eventually, Communist society, eliminating classes and realizing universal harmony.”¹

Now he bracketed the peasantry with what he called “reactionary classes” and “promised” collectivization in the following words :

“This job of reforming the reactionary classes can be handled only by a state having a people’s democratic dictatorship. When the work has been completed, China’s major exploiting classes—the landlord class and the bureaucratic capitalist class, i.e., the monopoly capitalist class—will have been finally eliminated.

“Then there will remain only the national bourgeoisie. In the present stage a great deal of suitable educational work can be done among them. When the time comes to realise Socialism, that is, to nationalise private enterprise, we will go a step further in our work of educating and reforming them. The people have a strong state apparatus in their hands, and they do not fear rebellion on the part of the national bourgeoisie.

“The education of the peasantry presents a serious problem. Peasant economy is dispersed. According to the Soviet Union’s experience, it takes a long time and much painstaking work before agriculture can be socialised. Without the socialisation of agriculture, there can be no complete and consolidated socialism. If we wish to socialise agriculture, we must develop a strong industry having state-operated enterprises as its main component. The state of the people’s democratic dictatorship must, step by step, solve the problem of industrialising the country.”²

1. On People’s Democratic Dictatorship, page 16-17, Foreign Languages press, Peking, 1950.

2. Ibid, pages 18-19.

Why does Mao regard the peasantry as a reactionary class and why does he require a long time for its “re-education?” The whole world has been thinking of Mao as essentially a peasant leader. The only explanation is that Mao’s loyalty to Leninism-Stalinism and to the Soviet Union as a perfect model of human society far outweighs his loyalty to the poor Chinese peasant who has catapulted him into power. Lenin and Stalin regard the peasantry as a capitalist class. Lenin had characterised the peasants and small producers in the following words :

“They encircle the proletariat on every side with a petty-bourgeois atmosphere, which permeates and corrupts the proletariat and causes constant relapse among the proletariat into petty bourgeois spinelessness, disunity, individualism, and alternate moods of exaltation and dejection. *It is a thousand times easier* to vanquish the centralised big bourgeoisie than to vanquish the millions and millions of small owners, yet they by their ordinary, everyday, *imperceptible, illusive, demoralising activity, achieve the very results which the bourgeoisie need* and which tend to restore the bourgeoisie.”¹

Stalin is equally positive :

“Lenin said that the peasantry is the last capitalist class. Is this thesis correct? Yes, it is absolutely correct. Why is the peasantry described as the last capitalist class ? Because, of the two main classes of which our society is composed, the peasantry is a class whose economy is based on private property and small commodity production. Because the peasantry as long as it remains a peasantry carrying on small commodity production, will breed capitalists in its ranks, and cannot help breeding them constantly and continuously. This is of decisive importance in the question of our Marxian attitude to the problem of the alliance between the working class and the peasantry.”²

Those who have illusions about Mao Tse-tung’s policies towards the peasantry should better read some documents of Chinese Communism.

1. Lenin: Selected Works, Vol. II, part II, page 367, Moscow, 1951.

2. Problems of Leninism, page 257-58, Moscow, 1942.

II

THE CHANGE IN PROPAGANDA LINE

Sri Chelapathi Rao, a member of our cultural delegation, wrote on his return from China:

“The elimination of the feudal system is to proceed along tactical lines, according to local consciousness and not to be attempted overnight. Rely on the poor peasants, unite with the middle peasants, preserve the rich peasant economy. Develop agricultural production. These are the aims. These are, however, not the ultimate aims. The communists are not philanthropists, as Liu Shao Chi reminds us. For the Chinese, agrarian reform and industrialisation is linked together and for the ultimate Socialist phase. They are careful about classifying the peasants in a way which is scientific compared to the haphazard classification of pre-revolution days. For the aim is to set free new social forces and look forward.”¹

Mr. Frank Moraes observed the same process, though he was not at all enthusiastic about it. He wrote :

“Like Stalin, Mao zig-zags to his target. Today the capitalist and the rich peasant are acknowledged entities of society. Neither of these classes will have a place in the final scheme of things when the present People’s Democratic Dictatorship is replaced by the dictatorship of the proletariat.”²

The Chinese Communists know from the experience of Russia that the peasants would resist collectivisation

1. National Herald dated 13. 7. 52.

2. Times of India, 24. 6. 52

to the point of a civil war. They are, therefore, very careful in making their preparations and would start forced collectivisation only when they are fully prepared with instruments of repression. But the time is not far off. Stalin formulated the basic law of the “proletarian revolution” in the following words :

“The heroes of the Second International asserted (and continue to assert) that between the bourgeois-democratic revolution and the proletarian there is a chasm or at any rate a Chinese Wall, separating one from the other by a more or less protracted interval of time. It is hardly necessary to prove that this Chinese wall ‘theory’ is totally devoid of meaning under the conditions of imperialism. It is hardly necessary to prove that bourgeois-democratic revolution in a more or less developed country must, under such circumstances, verge upon the proletarian revolution, that the former must pass into the latter. The history of the revolution in Russia has provided palpable proof that this thesis is correct and incontrovertible.”¹

Mao Tse-tung regards Stalin as “the leader of the world revolution” and says : “Stalin’s appearance in the history of mankind is a tremendous event. Thanks to Stalin, the cause of the revolution has developed successfully.” Naturally, Mao must obey and fulfil Stalin’s “incontrovertible thesis” of the “bourgeois-democratic revolution” passing into the “proletarian revolution” immediately. So he declared at a session of the National Committee of the People’s Consultative Conference in 1950 that “after we have created a flourishing national economy and culture, after all the conditions are ripe and after the entire country has approved it, we will enter the new era of socialism in our unwavering forward march.” It would not take long for Red China to have a “flourishing” economy and “culture”, if even one-hundredth of their reported strides

1. Problems of Leninism, page 37, Moscow, 1942.

have really taken place, and it would be the task of the Communist Party to see that the entire country “approves” the step towards “Socialism.”

The Communists did not mention the word “collectivisation” in the Common Programme adopted by the first Plenary Session of the Chinese People’s PCC on September 29, 1949, in Peking. We reproduce below Article Nos. 27 and 34 which refer to agriculture :

“**Article 27**—Agrarian reform is the necessary condition for the development of the nation’s productive power and for its industrialization. In all areas where agrarian reform has been carried out, *the ownership of the land acquired by the peasants shall be protected*. In areas where agrarian reforms has not been carried out, the peasant masses must be set in motion to establish peasant organizations and to put into effect the policy ‘land to tiller’ through such measures as the elimination of local bandits and despots, the reduction of rent and interest and the distribution of land.

“**Article 34**—Agriculture, forestry, fisheries and animal-husbandry: In all areas where agrarian reform has been thoroughly carried out, the central task of the people’s government shall be the organization of the peasants and of all man-power available for allocation to the development of agricultural production and secondary occupations. The People’s Government shall also guide the peasants step by step, in the organization of various forms of mutual aid in labour and coooperation in production, according to the *principle of willingness and mutual benefit*. In newly liberated areas, every step in agrarian reforms shall be linked up with reviving and developing agricultural production.

“The People’s Government shall, in accordance with the state plan and the requirements of the people’s livelihood, strive to restore the output of grain, industrial raw materials and export goods to the pre-war

production level and to surpass it within the shortest possible time. Attention shall be paid to construction and repair of irrigation works, to prevention of floods and droughts, to restoration and development of animal husbandry, to increasing the supply of fertilizers, to improvement of farm implements and seeds, to relief work in the event of natural calamities, and to planned migration for land reclamation.”¹

Nor did they place such an overwhelming emphasis on the development of heavy industry. Article No. 35 said clearly :

“Industry: In order to lay the foundation for the industrialization of the country, the central point of industrial work shall be planned, systematic rehabilitation and development of heavy industry, such as mining, the iron and steel industry, power industry, machine-making industry, electrical industry and the main chemical industries etc. At the same time, *the production of the textile industry and other light industries beneficial to the national welfare and to the people's livelihood shall be restored and increased so as to meet the needs of the people's daily consumption.*”²

The aim in agriculture was defined to be land-reform which meant redistribution of land and improvement of agriculture with a view to greater production. In a report delivered at the Third Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on June 6, 1950, Mao Tse-Tung outlined the significance of agrarian reform in the “fight for a fundamental turn for the better in the financial and economic situation in China.” Calling for a change of tactics, he exhorted :

“The work of agrarian reform should be carried forward by stages and in an orderly manner. As

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1. The Important Documents of the First Plenary Session of The Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, pages 11-14, Foreign Languages Press, Peking 1949.
 2. Ibid, page 14.

the war has been fundamentally ended on the mainland, so the situation is entirely different from that of the 1946-48 period when the PLA was locked in a life-and-death struggle with the KMT reactionaries and the issue had not yet been decided. The state can now use the method of granting loans to help poor peasants to solve their difficulties, thus making up for the poor peasants' receiving less land than under the previous land redistribution policy. Therefore, there should be a change in our policy towards the rich peasants, a change from the policy of requisitioning the surplus land and property of the rich peasants to one of preserving a rich peasant economy in order to further the early restoration of production in the rural areas. This change of policy will also serve to isolate the landlords while protecting the middle peasants and those who rent out small plots of land."¹

Land-reform was reported as complete by September 1952. Liao Lu-yen, Deputy Secretary-General, People's Government, wrote on September 28, 1952.

"The land-reform movement has, in the main, been completed throughout China. During the past three years the reform has been carried out in areas with a rural population totalling 300 million. Added to the rural population of the old Liberated Areas where land-reform was completed before 1940, this amounts to over 90 per cent of the nation's total rural population. Apart from national minority areas like Sinkiang and Tibet, and Taiwan which is still awaiting liberation, the land reform has not yet been carried out in areas embracing a rural population of only thirty million. But it will be completed in these areas within this year or before the spring ploughing next year, at the latest. In the agricultural areas of the national minorities in Sinkiang, land reform is to be carried out in this winter or next spring."²

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1. *China Wins Economic Battles*, page 7, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1950.
 2. *New China's Economic Achievements*, page 165. China Committee for the Promotion of International Trade, Peking, 1952.

He foresaw another era and said:

“Large-scale economic construction is about to begin in our country. The basic completion of land-reform on a nation-wide scale has been one of the *pre-requisites* for this.

“The practice of past three years has proved that land reform greatly accelerates restoration and development of agricultural production, ensures an adequate supply of grain for the nation and increases the production of industrial raw materials.”¹

At the same time we find another significant development, a high-pressure propaganda for collective farms. Peasant delegates sent to Russia report miracles that have happened under collectivisation in that country. Here are a few instances from the Chinese press :

“In an interview before he left Moscow for China on August 13th, Chang Lin-chih, head of the Chinese peasant delegation to the Soviet Union gave these impressions of his visit:

“From our visit, we fully appreciate that agriculture *must take the road of collectivisation*. Only through collectivisation can machinery and advanced agricultural technique be well-utilised and peasants step out on the happy road of Socialism instead of the thorny path of capitalism.”²



“Model peasants of the Chinese peasants’ delegation to the Soviet Union express one common view, ‘there is no end of good in collectivisation of agriculture.’ This conclusion is drawn from their visit to many villages in Ukraine, Caucasus and Kazakhstan.

1. New China’s Economic Achievements, Page 165, China Committee for the Promotion of International Trade, Peking, 1952.

2. New China News Agency, August 14, 1952.

“From the experiences of the Soviet Union, we see that, in order to collectivise, it is necessary to join small plots of land to form a large one. It is necessary to build machines and organize manpower.

“When our agricultural producers co-operatives are developed one step further, we will have collective farms. We must tell our peasants more about the advantages of collectivisation. At present we must exert all our efforts to make our agricultural producers cooperatives a success, accumulate more and more public property and use the available new farms tools. At the same time, we must develop our industry to build farm machinery. Our agriculture must guarantee enough raw material needed for industry, and industry in turn will provide us with agricultural machinery.

“A look at the Soviet villages made me see that our future is very bright. Our agricultural producer cooperative is a first step towards collectivisation . *The Soviet Union today is our tomorrow.*”¹



“A reception in honour of the Chinese peasant delegation which has returned from tour of the Soviet Union was given by the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association and its North China and Peking branches yesterday.

“Present at the occasion were Vice-President Li Chi-shen and Wu Ychang and General Secretary Chien Chun-ji of the Association.

“Charge d’Affairs of the Soviet Embssy, I . F. Kurdynkov and over 23 peasant representatives in Peking also attended.

“Relating their experiences, Chang Lin-chin, leader of the peasant delegation, said, ‘*After more than a three month tour, we have gained a deeper understanding of the superiority of political, economic and cultural aspects*

1. New China New Agency, Moscow, August 22, 1952.

of the Soviet Union, great Socialist country. We believe ever more strongly that agriculture must be collectivised. Only through collectivisation can peasants forever be rid of their poverty and achieve a prosperous and happy life. We pledge that we will apply advanced experience we learned in the Soviet Union to the construction of New China to strengthen the defence of peace."¹



"Fixed notions about limits of agricultural output are being shaken in Shansi Province as seven model peasants who toured the Soviet Union report the remarkable results achieved in Soviet farming.

"Reports by these model peasants on gigantic transformation of nature that is being carried out in Siberia with the help of advanced Soviet science were also tremendously inspiring to peasants. 'We too have the possibility of going forward to Socialism and Communism if we follow the example of our Soviet brothers in Siberia', said one.

"A study of collectivisation of agriculture in the Soviet Union is convincing them. It is not mere government decrees but most patient education, with practical evidence of results, that will gradually and steadily lead millions of peasants forward to collectivised agriculture.

"Organisation in farming is really a second agrarian revolution. Any talk of future collectivization is empty unless we go forward now from mutual-aid teams to cooperatives and so lay the foundations well."²



"Sweeping changes have taken place in Kuhan village. Ching-feng country, Honan Province, since one of its peasants, Chang Hsush-hau, returned from a visit to the Society Union.

1. Pa Kung Pao, Hongkong, Oct 6, 1952.

2. NCNA, Taiyun, Nov. 22, 1952.

“Everybody admired the new camera and gramophone presented to him in the Soviet Union, he said, but what they really appreciated most were his accounts of the wonderful life led by Soviet collective farmers. It was like a trip into the future, and the peasants are talking about collectivisation in every street now.”¹



Some model collective farms have been established inside Red China to “inspire” the peasants to accept collectivization, Again, we give some instances from the Chinese press:

“Mechanized state farms of new China have gained great development in past three years.

“These farms have introduced advanced farming system of the Soviet Union. On the basis of advanced Soviet work methods, these farms also adopt the scientific methods of deep ploughing, close planting and trimming and direct their attention to such technical measures as disposal of seeds, weeding, prevention and purge of plant diseases and insect pests.

“By means of advanced production methods and agronomy, the *state farms have preliminarily demonstrated the superiority of collectivisation and mechanisation of agricultural production*, thus setting an example to the broad masses of peasants. Some state farms also collectively help peasants embark on the path of collectivisation.”²



“A new collective farm has just been inaugurated in the area of Changchin, Shansi Province.

1. NCNA Peking, Dec 1, 1952

2. Ta Kung Pao, Hongkong, Oct 6, 1952

“By their own experience, many peasants saw the superiority of collective as against individual production and decided to try full-blown collective farming. Their *earnest demand* has now resulted in setting up of the new collective farm. The farm was christened ‘Sino-Soviet Friendship Collective Farm’, at the inaugural ceremony, in honour of the current ‘Sino-Soviet Friendship Month’.”¹



“In the past five years, owing to correct leadership, strenuous efforts of the staff members and workers and help from Soviet friends, *545 state farms have been set up*.

“The major task of the state farms is to *demonstrate* for the peasants to tread on the path of collective production, and fulfil the mission of fostering technical personnel for agricultural work.”²



“A recent Northeast State Farm Conference was held under the auspices of the Northeast Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.

“While streamlining work of existing state farms, the conference decided to establish additional state farms to develop socialist sector of China’s agriculture and *gradually draw the Peasantry* into the path of mechanized and collectivised agriculture.”³



“Ten machine and tractor stations are to be established at various points in the country this year.

1. NCNA, Taiyun, Nov 26, 1952
2. Hongkong *Ta Kung Pao*, Feb 5, 1953
3. NCNA Mukden, Dec 12, 1952

“These machine and tractor stations will help peasants in their gradual progress towards collective farming.

“134 trainees were formerly administrative cadres and farm technicians in various parts of the country. Their training was undertaken with the help of Soviet and Hungarian specialists.”¹

It seems, however, that the state farms are not very successful models. Peking paper *Jen Min Jit Pao* contained the following report in its issue dated December 10, 1952:

“The state farm is a new type of agricultural economy, socialist in nature, a big economy employing new technique. It possesses incomparable superiority over the economy of the small peasant. It is the most advanced component of our present agricultural economy as a whole. *But the absolute majority of the state farms today are not properly managed*, and the special characteristics of this new-type of agricultural enterprise have not been fully grasped, and *its superiority not manifested*. On the one hand there have been too much *loss and waste*. Added to these facts have been the *excessive numbers of non-productive personnel*, and the huge costs of transportation, all contributing to *high production costs*, and providing the principal *cause for incomes not to balance expenses*.

“On the other hand, there were also such conditions and the *unbalanced assignment of machinery equipment* with an overabundance of power machines and *a lack of working machines*, improper care of machinery equipment and lack of regular inspections and repairs and *failure to operate such equipment* according to technical instructions. *Damage and accidents become numerous*, creating serious damage and waste, and lowering the efficiency of the equipment.

“In order to provide a guarantee for the fulfillment of the above mentioned tasks, *the political*

1 NCNA, Peking, Feb 21, 1953

work in state farms must be strengthened, and the political consciousness of employees and workers raised carrying out thoroughly the policy of making a good task of running the farms with reliance on the whole body of employees and workers. A state farm is a socialist enterprise, and the most advanced component of the agricultural economy as a whole. The interests of the employees and workers in the farms are identical with the interests of the farms themselves. They are the masters of the farms and work in state farms is glorious and important work.”

It is not strange that the communist bosses should talk of raising the “political consciousness of employees and workers” while aiming at demonstrating the “superiority” of collective farms. For, as the Russian experiment informs us, the collective farms are not better producers of agricultural wealth in which the peasants can take pride. Collectivisation is only a lever by which the communist bosses are lifted into total power over the country-side. The only gain of the peasants-turned-proletariat is “enhanced political consciousness” due to which while they starve and go naked, they have to believe and announce that they are the best fed and clothed people on earth.

Nor do the communists entirely depend upon “political consciousness”. They understand perfectly the way on which “History” wants to travel and have no pity to waste on those who impede the course of “History.” Collectivisation of agriculture is an important milestone in Communist theory of “History” and the communists, who regard themselves as the midwives appointed by “History” herself, are prepared to use the “necessary” force to enable “History” to deliver the “legitimate” child. In the next section we shall describe how the Chinese communists are getting ready to use force.

III

TACTICS OF A NEW CIVIL WAR

Writing in the *Cominform Journal* dated 26th, September, 1952, Po Yi Po, Member of the Centre Committee of the Communist Party of China stated:

“In the past three years, we have liquidated more than two million bandits. Bandits are non-existent in China now and the social order has become stable.”

We cannot believe that he did not know of a very important development which had taken place in his country, a few weeks earlier. The Ministry of Public Security of the Central People's Government had proclaimed the “*Provisional Regulations Covering Organisation of Security Committees*” on August 10. These *Regulations* had been reviewed and approved by the Government Administration Council of the Central People's Government on June 27. We reproduce some of the important articles and clauses to show what these Security Committees are supposed to do :

“**Art 1:** For the purpose of *mobilising the masses to help People's Government in anti-treason, anti-espionage, anti-robbery and anti-fire activities* and in stamping out counter-revolutionary activities, thereby to protect the state and public order, it is stipulated that *all cities*, following the start of the campaign for suppression of counter-revolutionaries, and *all rural districts*, following the completion of agrarian reform, shall universally set up security committees.

“Art 3: The Security Committees shall be established, using generally organ, factory, enterprise, school and street as unit in cities and administrative villages as unit in rural districts.

“Art 4: The election of members of the Security Committees:

(i) Persons among the people who have a *clean history and are upright* in working style, *adept in linking up with the masses and enthusiastic in security work* may be elected as members.

(ii) The election of members of security committees should be preceded by adequate preparations. *The masses shall nominate the candidates and only after introductions, reviews, consultations and full preparations should election be held.*

“Art 5: Concrete tasks of the Security Committees shall be:

(i) To maintain close connections with the massed and to *conduct regular propaganda-education* to the masses on anti-treason, anti-espionage, anti-fire and anti-robbery activities and on suppression of counter-revolutionary activities, thereby to enhance the *political vigilance* of the masses.

(ii) To organise and lead the masses to help the Government and public security organs to *denounce, supervise and control* counter-revolutionary elements in order to strictly guard against counter-revolutionary sabotage activities.

(iii) To organise and lead the masses to help the Government and the public security organs to *conduct education and ideological reform of families of counter-revolutionaries* for the purpose of winning them over to the support of the policies and measures of the Government.

(iv) To mobilise the masses jointly to sign patriotic compacts against traitors and to organise the masses to seriously carry them out in order to maintain social order.

“**Art. 6:** The function and power of the Security Committee shall be :

(i) Responsibility of *arresting and turning over to the Government* and public security organs of counter-revolutionaries caught, flagrant derelicts and criminals wanted by law, but they have no power to try, imprison or dispose of such criminals.

(ii) Responsibility of *investigating, supervising, prosecuting and denouncing counter-revolutionaries other than those caught in the act*, but they have no power to arrest, detain search or restrict them.

(iii) Responsibility of educating the masses to preserve the revolutionary order and of *supervising the persons subject to control in labor and production, forbidding them to speak and act indiscriminately and reporting in time to the public security organs on their behaviour*, but they have no power to detain punish or evict them.

(iv) Assistance to public security personnel in protecting the scene of crime of sabotage by counter-revolutionaries in order to facilitate the public security organs to make investigation but they may not disturb or deal with it.

“**Art. 9:**

(i) *Those who work actively and achieve marked success should be commended and rewarded in time, while those who become estranged from the masses and violate discipline should be subject to criticism and punishment in good time. Both reward and punishment must be carried out only after discussions by the masses and approval by leadership organs.*”¹

1 NCNA, Peking, Aug. 10, 1952.

Now, the question naturally arises that if the 'People's' Government in China has already liquidated 2,000,000 "bandits" and enjoys the 'respect loyalty' of the entire "people", who and where are the "traitors, spies, robbers, saboteurs, and counter-revolutionaries" whom these far-flung Security Committees are designed to detect, denounce and destroy? One answer could be that these "enemies of the people" are being dropped into "People's China" from outside, by "Anglo-American Imperialists". Another explanation is that a large number of the Chinese people are themselves becoming "Counter-Revolutionaries," continuously and on a scale such as to justify the nationwide tightening of security measures. As the first hypothesis is manifestly absurd we shall try to elaborate the second one.

We have already pointed out an important tenet of Leninism- Stalinism according to which small owners and small-producers including the petty-bourgeoisie and the peasantry become counter-revolutionary as socialisation proceeds. They have to be dealt with very firmly. Mao Tse-tung accepts this tenet. Speakign before the First Plenary Session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference on September 21, 1949, Mao declared :

"Our revolutionary work is not yet concluded. The People's Liberation War and the people's revolutionary movement are still forging ahead and we must continue our efforts. The imperialists and the *domestic reactionaries* will certainly not take their defeat lying down; they will still put up a final struggle. After peace has been attained throughout the country, they may still sabotage and create various forms of disturbances. *Daily, hourly*, they will try to restore their rule in China. This is inevitable and beyond all doubt. Therefore we *must not relax our vigilance.*"¹

1 Mao Tse-tung on People's Democratic Dictatorship, page 43, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1950.

Thus alone can we understand the formation of Security Committees by the Chinese Communist Government in the hour of their supreme triumph. The Security Committees are not a legacy of the Civil War but a preparation for the future battles which the Chinese communists clearly envisage with the people under their heel at present. A glimpse at the history of Russia, after the communist victory in the civil war by 1921, would further facilitate our understanding of the trend. The Russian Government ended the N.E.P. and launched a collectivisation drive in which millions of peasants had to rebel and die. Next the terror turned upon the Bolshevik Party, the Secret Police, the Red Army and the intelligentsia, and ended in bloody purges and the growth of numerous concentration camps. The Communist Party of China must in near future, repeat the Russian pattern, as it is being repeated in "People's Democracies" of Eastern Europe. The "bourgeois-democratic revolution" in China must very soon pass into the "proletarian revolution."

At present, Chinese "New Democracy" is composed of four classes—the national bourgeoisie, the petty-bourgeoisie, the proletariat and the peasantry. The two bourgeois classes must disappear entirely and the peasantry must be reduced to proletariat in order to transform the "bourgeois-democratic revolution" into the "socialist" or "proletarian revolution." The first two classes are not of any importance in Red China and would disappear immediately if the communists so much as move a finger. But the collectivisation of agriculture and consequent disinheriting of the peasantry is a task of serious proportions. That is why the communists are proceeding so cautiously and so meticulously. The usual communist technique is to divide those whom they want to destroy.

That technique is being employed in tackling the Chinese peasantry. They divided the Chinese peasants into five classes as early as 1950. The Agrarian Reform Law of The People's Republic of China promulgated by the Central People's Government of June 30, 1950 divided the peasantry in five classes as under :

“A person shall be classified as *landlord* who owns land, but does not engage in labour or only engages in supplementary labour, and who depends on exploitation for his means of livelihood.

“Some *bankrupt landlords* who, despite their bankruptcy and their ability to work, do not engage in labour, and whose living conditions are better than those of an ordinary middle peasant, shall continue to be classified as landlords.

“Any person, who collects rent and manages the landed property for landlords and depends on the exploitation of peasants by the landlords as his main means of livelihood, and whose living conditions are better than those of an ordinary middle peasant shall be treated in the same manner as a landlord.

“A *rich peasant* generally owns land. But there are also *rich peasants who own only part of the land they cultivate and rent the rest from others. There are others who own no land but rent all their land from others.* Generally speaking, they own better means of production and some floating capital and take part in labour themselves, but are as a rule dependent on exploitation for a part or the major part of their means of livelihood

“*Many middle peasants* own land. Some possess only a portion of the land which they cultivate while the remainder is rented. *Some of them are landless*, and rent all their land from others. The middle peasants depend wholly or mainly upon their own labour for their living. In general they do not exploit others.

“Some poor peasants own inadequate farm implements and a part of the land they cultivate. Some have no land at all and own some inadequate farm implements. In general they have to rent land for cultivation, and are exploited by others in the form of land rent, loan interest or hired labour in a limited degree. These people shall be classified as *poor peasants*.

“*Workers* generally have neither land nor farm implements. Some of them have a small amount of land and very few implements. They depend wholly or mainly upon the sale of their labour power for their living. These people shall be classified as workers,”¹

This classification is based upon spurious statistics adopted by the Chinese communists from the records of the so-called Agricultural Society in 1935. The statistics were as follows:-

Class	Percentage of Peasant Population	Percentage of land they own.
Landlords	4%	50%
Rich Peasants	6%	18%
Middle Peasants	20%	15%
Poor Peasants	70%	17%

That these statistics have been accepted purely for instrumental reasons or a civil war in the country-side would become obvious if we compare them with the statistics published by the Government of China just before the Second World War. They were as follows :—

1. The Agrarian Reform Law of The People's Republic of China, Pages 19-24, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1951.

No. of Acres owned.	Percentage of Peasant Population.	Percentage of land they own.
0—5	35.61%	6.21%
5—10	23.99%	11.42%
10—15	13.17%	10.63%
15—20	7.99%	9.17%
20—30	8.22%	13.17%
30—50	6.27%	15.54%
50—70	2.17%	8.38%
70—100	1.31%	7.16%
100—150	0.72%	5.71%
150—200	0.24%	2.76%
200—300	0.20%	3.17%
300—500	0.11%	2.63%
500—1000	0.50%	2.30%
1000	0.20%	1.75%

Comparing the two sets of statistics we find very important discrepancies. If we take 4% of the upper class peasant population from the National Government statistics, it means that peasants owning about 60 acres or more land are classified as landlords. But this 4 per cent does not seem to possess more than 30 per cent of the total land. In order to arrive at the 50 percent figure we have to include peasants owning 30 to 50 acres of land, but in that case their proportion as percentage of the peasant population rises to about 12 percent, which would include not only the rich peasants but also about 2 percent of the middle peasants in the communist classification. Similarly, if we take 70 percent of the lower strata of peasantry from the second classification they possess more than 28 percent of the total land and not only 17 percent as the communist classification would have us believe. But as the communists believe in the unity of theory and practice, facts must obey

their theoretical demands and land distribution in the Chinese country-side must be presented to prove the possibility and desirability of a civil war.

Commenting on the Agrarian Reform Law, Liu-Shao Chi made a report on June 14, 1950 at the Second Session of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in Peking. He said:

“The essential content of agrarian reform is the confiscation of the land of landlord class for distribution to the landless or land-poor peasants. Thus the landlords as a class in society are abolished and the land ownership system of feudal exploitation is transformed into a system of peasant land ownership.”¹

“But the basic aim of agrarian reform is not purely one of relieving the poor peasants. It is designed to set free the rural productive forces from the shackles of the feudal land ownership system of the landlord class in order to develop agricultural production and thus pave the way of New China's industrialisation. The problem of poverty among the peasants can be finally solved only if agricultural production can be greatly developed, if the industrialisation of New China can be realised, if the living standards of the people throughout the country can be raised and if China finally embark upon the road to Socialism. The mere carrying out of agrarian reform can only solve part, but not the whole, of the problem of the peasants' poverty.”²

After explaining the methods of “confiscation and requisitioning of land”, emphasising the need to “preserve rich peasant economy” and explaining “some problems concerning land distribution”, Liu Shao Chi dwelt upon “points for attention during agrarian reform.” He said ;

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1. The Agrarian Reform Law of the People's Republic of China, Page 75, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1951.
 2. Ibid, Pages 78-79.

“Agrarian reform is a *systematic and fierce struggle*. Our general line to be followed in the forthcoming agrarian reform is that reliance should be placed on the poor peasants and farm labourers, while uniting with the middle peasants, *neutralising the rich peasants* in order to eliminate the feudal exploitation system step by step with discrimination and to develop agricultural production. The peasants’s associations should be the main organisational forms and executive organs of the forces of agrarian reform.¹

“The purity of the leadership of the peasants’ associations at all levels should be safeguarded. The masses should be mobilised to re-elect the leadership where there is impurity. Here, the term “purity” does not mean the adoption of a close-door attitude toward such farm labourers, poor peasants or middle peasants who have committed certain errors. Nor does it mean their exclusion from the peasants’s associations. On the contrary, they should be welcomed into the associations, educated and brought into unity. *The term ‘purity here means to prevent landlords, rich peasants and their agents from joining the peasants’ associations and, still more important, from holding leading positions in the peasants’ associations.*

“The main leadership of the peasants’ association must be chosen from among the poor peasants and farm labourers. But real alliance with the middle peasants and, above all, real protection of their land and property (including that of the well-to-do middle peasants) from encroachment is indispensable. At the same time, active middle peasants must be absorbed into the leadership of the peasants’ associations. It should be stipulated that one third of the leadership of the peasants’ associations at all levels should be chosen from among the middle peasants. This is absolutely necessary. *No poor peasants’ leagues should be organised in addition to the peasants’ associations. Nor should trade unions be organised in the village.*²

1. The Agrarian Reform Law of The People’s Republic of China, page 92, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1951.

2. Ibid, Pages 93-94.

“The People’s Government should call together the rich peasants, inform them of the Government’s policy and explain the actions of the peasants’ associations in order to *dispel their suspicions and misgiving.*”¹

In the above passages Liu Shao Chi defined the basic aim of agrarian reform as “setting free of the rural productive forces.” That was in June 1950. In December the same year Teng Tzu-hui, 3rd Secretary, Central South Bureau, Central Committee, Chinese Communist Party, made a broadcast over the Central-South Radio station regarding the “Political Significance of Agrarian Reform.” He sounded a different note. He said:

“Some comrades look upon agrarian reform as the simple matter of the distribution of land, which in turn is considered a simple technical job, and thus understand the problem of agrarian reform merely as a means for the development of production. *This view is incorrect.* It must be understood that agrarian reform constitutes the basic content of the New democratic revolution in China at the present stage.

“We may realize, therefore, that agrarian reform is not carried out merely for the development of production, but is rather a basic task of the Chinese people for the fulfillment of their revolutionary mission and the establishment of China as a member of the modern world. We all know that the landlord class, this feudal force which stands together with our great enemy imperialism, is not a weak and effeminate foe, but one with a history of ruling the country for more than 1,000 years, with deep-rooted ruling powers.

“It may be realized that it is not easy to wipe out the landlord class, this cruel and stubborn foe. The job must be *carried out with a fierce class struggle conducted with measured steps and the systematic coordination of various forces.*

1 Ibid, page 95.

“Only thus attending to the thorough destruction of the forces of the landlord class on the military, political, organizational, ideological, and economic fronts, may this most stubborn of enemies—the feudal influences—which have ruling history for 2,000 years, be overthrown. The enforcement of agrarian reform, the confiscation of feudal property, and the distribution of land constitute the most ferocious stage of the struggle. If such a series of struggles is not carried out, if co-ordination among the different phases of the struggle is not maintained, and agrarian reform is merely looked upon as the simple distribution of land, a simple technical issue, then a grave political error in principle will be committed. This is the fountain source of the *ideological tendency toward the peaceful process* of agrarian reform which has emerged in various areas. *Such a deviation will lead agrarian reform down the road to failure.*

“Another reason giving birth to the tendency toward the peaceful process of agrarian reform has been the consideration of agrarian reform merely as the means to attain to objective of the development of production economically, and the failure to realize the aim of the wiping out of feudalism and the overthrow of the enemy in the midst of agrarian reform, and the establishment of the revolutionary dictatorship of the peasants, for the creation of the pre-requisites for the large scale development of production.

“For only with the thorough overthrow of feudal influences and the complete liberation of the broad masses of peasants from the bondage of the feudal system will there be the possibility for the raising, by a substantial degree, of the agricultural productivity of China for the industrialization of the country. In order to mobilize the masses fully, to overthrow the feudal influences thoroughly, and to establish the dictatorship of the peasants over the landlords, *even if some confusion should emerge in the midst of the struggle, even if for a short period after agrarian reform, productivity should be slightly reduced, these considerations should not stand in the way.*

“Lenin, in the first draft of his report in 1920 before the Communist International on the land problem, said, ‘For the victory of the revolution, the proletariat shall not be afraid of the temporary phenomenon of a reduction in production.’ He also said, ‘In the view of the bourgeoisie, the important thing is production for the sake of production. As to the proletariat and the exploited masses, especially the exploited masses, the important thing is to ensure that the toiler should possess the conditions for working for their own interests and not for the interests of the exploiters. *The first and basic mission of the proletariat is to guarantee the victory and the permanency of the victory of the proletariat.*’

“Although nation-wide victory has already been achieved in our revolution and the war has been basically concluded in our country, it must, however, be admitted that *the people’s government in the newly liberated areas is still not fully consolidated.* We have only controlled the machinery at the high levels, most of the basic administration apparatus are still in the hands of feudal influences. *The bandit menace has not yet been fully stamped out.* The imperialists are actively preparing a third war, and though the democratic forces of the people of the world have a strong force to check the outbreak of war, the danger of war is nevertheless still existent.

“It is obvious, therefore, that if in the process of agrarian reform, we should, fail to overthrow feudal influences thoroughly, to mobilize the masses fully, to establish genuinely the peasants’ revolutionary dictatorship in every village and every corner of the countryside, *then should war break out, the feudal influences will emerge everywhere and effects will be produced on our security, communications and transportation in the rear lines, on our sources of manpower and food, so that the effects will be felt in the future of war and the consolidation of our government, while production will also not be developed. We can definitely see such consequences,*

“*All rightist opportunist ideological tendencies giving rise to the principle of peaceful agrarian reform and to*

fears that the mass movement may affect production so that no free hand is given to the mobilization of the masses must be thoroughly overcome and corrected."¹

Now it is clear that the Chinese communists are aiming at nothing less than the complete overthrow of what they call "feudal influences" and are not afraid of confusion and fall in production that may arise as a consequence of the new "class-struggle." The direction of the first blow in this new war was made known to the Chinese victims and the outside world when Lin Pao, Chairman of the Central-South Military and Administrative Committee, signed an order on August 18, 1952, proclaiming "Measures for the Control and Reform of Landlords in the Central South Region". The order reads:

"In order to safeguard the acquired interests of the peasants from agrarian reform, and the revolutionary order in the rural areas; to enforce *reform through labour service*² of landlords so that they may become new people; there are now formulated the "Provisional Measures for the Control and Reform of Landlords in the Central-South Region," these Measures having been passed at the 81st administrative meeting of the Committee and examined and ratified by the Government Administration Council of the Central People's Government. The Measures are hereby promulgated and put into force immediately."

We give below some of these "Measures" :

"3. Under any one of the undermentioned conditions, a landlord, in addition to being dealt with according to law, shall be placed under control:

1. Hankow *Ch'ang Chiang Jih Pao*, December 27, 1950.
2. This is the communist term for Slave-Labour.

(a) One who carries out a counter-attack or counter-struggle after the conclusion of agrarian reform.

(b) One who does not participate in *reform through labour service*, or engage in some other proper vocation, and is thus an idler given to illegal acts.

(c) One who was guilty of despotic or counter-revolutionary activities.

(d) One who had judgment passed on him according to law by the people's government and the people's tribunal of a higher level, and handed down to the masses for control.

4. Landlords included in the above article shall be subject to control under the following different measures according to the individual circumstances of their cases :

(a) Within a stipulated period, *he shall not receive caller or undertake long journeys without express permission.*

(b) He shall report at fixed intervals to the peasants' association on conditions relating to labor production, and one who is lazy may have compulsory measures applied against him.

(c) With the approval of the people's government of the level above the *hsien*, he may be transferred to another *hsien* or province to be placed under the control of the local government and to carry out *compulsory reform through labor service.*

"5. Landlords in *bsiang* who should be placed under control shall be listed, together with the period of control for each, by the peasants' association and presented within stipulated time to the conference of representatives of the people of the *bsiang* for discussion and examination,

and control shall be exercised after approval has been obtained from the *hsien* people's government.

"A controlled landlord, during the period of control, who seriously abides by the laws and regulations of the government, and undertakes actively labour service for reform, may, through the same procedure, have his control period shortened or terminated in accordance with the circumstances of his case. But if such a landlord should further be guilty of illegal acts or fails to undertake labour production, the seriousness of his case may be considered, and his control period extended or other penalties inflicted on him.

"9. A landlord who possesses labour power and is capable of engaging in agricultural labour and also does not have another vocation must be supervised and made to undertake *reform through labour services*.

"11. The *hsiang* people's government and the *hsiang* peasants association shall be jointly responsible for the work of the control and reform of landlords. *The Security Committee and the People's Militia* may be entrusted with the task of the *enforcement* of concrete control measures."¹

We have noted above that the landlords form about 4% of the peasant population in China. Thus 15 million² people are to be deprived of political rights and made to do forced-labour. No body except a China-worshipper can believe that so many people in China are landlords. And a regime which alienate so many people cannot be called civilised by any stretch of imagination. But such is the power of words with some people that they will accept mass-murder provided it is suitably described. According to Bernard Shaw, the mass slaughter of

1. Hankow *Ch'ang Chiang Jih Pao*, August 20, 1952.

2. China's Economic Problems, Page 10, People's Publishing House Ltd., Bombay, 1950.

peasantary in Russia was just “weeding the garden.” It is a pleasure to contemplate the “weeding of a garden” provided one does not happen to be a “weed” in the garden concerned. But no one knows who may not become a weed in the communist garden. The communists always give a bad name to the dog they want to hang !

Justifying the crusade against “landlords” the Hankow paper, *Change Chiang Jih Pao*, wrote a pompous editorial in its issue dated August 20, 1952. The editorial stated:

“In the Central-South region, in the four provinces of Honan, Hupen, Hunan and Kiangsi, agrarian reform has been basically concluded. *The landlord class as a social class has thus been wiped out.* But the experiences of the social reform movement in the rural areas during the past three years have testified to the fact that the *landlord class are not prepared to withdraw so lightly from the stage of history.* Many among them not only carried out a lot of sabotage activities, before the development of the social reform movement in the rural areas; and not only resisted and undermined with utmost determination the reform during its progress; but also continued, even after the completion of the agrarian reform movement, to struggle.

“It is abovious, therefore, that after the enforcement of agrarian reform, and the elimination of the feudal exploitative class, the work of the *reform of the living habits, ideological concepts, and actions of each of the individual members of the former feudal class* so that they may *become new persons*, is not an easy task, which can only be accomplished after a *long-term* and systematic struggle. Not only during the process of the social reform movement in the rural areas must there be launched a systematic and fierce struggle against the landlord class, but even after the enforcement of social reform, there must still be carried out a systematic reform of the landlord class before the victories of agrarian reform may be safeguarded and the foundations of the new social system may be consolidated.

“That is to say, the landlord class must be abolished, and after their abolition, the landlords individually must be reformed. And in order to reform them, they must be placed under control. The people’s democratic dictatorship’s duty is to protect and develop the interests of the revolutionary classes, to enforce a systematic dictatorship against the reactionary classes. *The landlord class, from its social status, is a reactionary class.*”

The same paper carried another feature in the same issue under the heading “Peasants in Central-South Region Attend to Control of Landlords”. It describes in detail how the landlords are being controlled. We give below some interesting portions of the story :

“The peasants in many districts in the Central-South region, in order to safeguard the fruits of their victory and to maintain the order needed for production, are undertaking actively the control of landlords and the supervision of the *reform of landlords through labour service*, for the consolidation of the people’s democratic dictatorship.

“Since the conclusion of agrarian reform, there have appeared in various areas such phenomena as law-defying landlords staging counter-attacks against the peasants, carrying out counter-settlement moves, and resisting the system of *reform through labour service*. In the Ta He Liu Chuang *hsiang* in Chio Shah *hsien* in Honan, for instance, in the one or two years following the conclusion of agrarian reform, of the 101 landlord households, 24 of them carried out counter-settlement of accounts with the peasants. *There were also 32 land-lords who tempted the peasants with women, and 29 other landlords who bought over militia men through the establishment of family relationships with them.* (All these landlords have since been punished). Such phenomena have also been widely reported from other areas.

“As agrarian reform has been completed, the only *outlet for the landlord class is to seek reform through labour service*. But there are still many landlords who

will undermine production, and openly resist labour service for their reform. In all areas, during each production season and in all production activities, there have been unceasingly discovered sabotage activities on the part of law-defying landlords.

“According to estimates from Yang Hsin *hsien* in Hupeh, because the landlords would not attend to production properly, production in the whole *hsien* is being reduced by about 10,000,000 catties of grain.

“According to investigations in a certain *hsiang* in China Shah *hsien* in Hupeh, landlords who exploited all sorts of pretexts to refuse carrying out properly reform through labour service constituted 30 percent of all the landlord (they have since been compelled to perform reform through labour service).

“In Wei Tung *ts'un* in Ting His *hsiang* In Yam *hsien*, Kwangsi, the wife of landlord Lo Wen-hsing did not work the land distributed her by the peasants association, but instead *made her two sons go begging for her support*. In the Li Cheng market town in Li Po *hsien*, Kwangsi, there suddenly arrived a month ago *more than 100 beggars*, the absolute majority of whom were found to landlords who refused to carry out reform through labour service and would live without toil. There were also law-defying *landlords who used women to entice the rural cadres and activist peasants*.

“At present, the peasants in many districts are continuing to repulse the counter offensive of the landlords and are strengthening their work in the control of the landlord class in order to safeguard the fruits of their victory and to preserve the order needed for production.

“In Lin *hsien* in Hunan, there have been created security committees of the *hsien*, *ch'u*, and *hsiang* levels, and all organization forces have been mobilized to make the work of rural security a regular task of the masses under proper leadership in order to strengthen the control of the landlord class. The measures carried out are as follows:

“(1) The penetrative investigation and understanding of the enemy situation, the exposure of his plots at sabotage, and the education of the cadres and peasants with concrete examples of sabotage work. Generally, one ideological investigation is carried out, and the struggle developed against rumours, against sabotage, against counter-settlement of accounts, and against acts of inducement and buying over. At the same time, the method is used of recalling the past, comparing the present, and looking into the future, to educate the cadres and peasants, and to establish among them *a permanent conception of the enemy's true status*.

“(2) The timely and vigorous suppression of all counter-revolutionary criminals caught in acts of the sabotage of production and the endangering of the life and property of the people, in order to safeguard the people's interests.

“(3) The strengthening of the work of the control of counter-revolutionaries in the rural areas, the compulsory reform through labour service of landlords who are required to conclude pacts for compliance with the law and plans for production. They are to be constantly investigated, their ideological changes given attention, and they are to be educated separately so that in labour service they may be thoroughly reformed.

“(4) *The organization of social intelligence systems with the employment of all organized forces, such as the peasants, associations, the militia corps, the youth league, women's associations, with the ts'un as a unit*, and the various duties of supervision, understanding of the enemy situation, distributed among different groups so that the situation may be constantly reported to the higher authorities.

(5) The development of the '3-preventive' and '5-protective' campaigns. The '3-preventive' campaign consists of the prevention of calamities (flood, drought, insect,

animal, fire); the prevention of thefts; and the prevention of sabotage by native bandits, special agents, and landlords. The '5-protective' campaign consists of the protection conservancy works; protection of communications; protection of godowns; protection of forests; and protection of draft animals as well as public buildings.

"In Ma Yang *hsien* in Hunan, the People's Tribunal sentenced to death law-defying landlord Chen Yun-tse who set fire to a forest and caused great loss to the assets of the people. The tribunal also sentenced to prison another landlord, Chang Sheng-Chia, who beat up a poor peasant, Nish Pi-sheng. Yet another landlord, Lung Yun-kusi, who colluded with 8 other landlords to organize a bogus mutual assistance team to undermine production, was placed under control.

"In many other areas, various effective and necessary means are being enforced for the control of landlords"

Any reader of this story can feel that the people who are being forced to do labour against their will are not landlords but only prosperous peasants whose property has been confiscated. It is these "landlords" who are toiling on various Chinese projects and building the Huai River Dam, about which many Indian travellers to China have waxed eloquent. A handful of real landlords cannot create an atmosphere in which the whole machinery of the government, police, army and the Communist Party has to be mobilised. A handful of landlords cannot neglect production to the extent of 10,000,000 catties in one season. If the landlords are really a handful, the noise made about them speaks very poorly of the "People's Democratic Dictatorship." If they are not a handful, then we must suspect the word landlord; it would, in that case, mean those who are opposed to the communist methods of land-reform, irrespective of the fact how much land they own. And if

so many people oppose "People's Democratic Dictatorship" it is difficult to understand what is "People's" about it.

That the peasantry in general is confused and bewildered by these tactics of the communist government becomes clear from a "Report on Production Movement" published in September, 1950. The report says:

"There are 1,225 households and 4,679 persons in the Liuchi *bsiang* in Hsin-chou *hsien*. The average land holding in the *bsiang* is 1.04 *mow* per head, but the holdings of poor peasants and hired farms hands are less than one *mow* per head.

"Agrarian reform began in the *bsiang* last winter and concluded in the spring. Reinvestigation has not yet begun. The result of classification of status during agrarian reform was as follows: 762 families of poor peasants and hired farm hands, 359 families of middle peasants, 36 families of rich peasants, 44 families of landlords, 11 families of small lessors of land, and 13 families of other status. Agrarian reform in this area had not the benefit of good foundation. There are five Party members in the area, 32 Youth League members, 14 propagandists, 21 committee members of the Peasants' Association, 25 committee members of the Women's League and some 210 militiamen. The social backgrounds of the village cadres are on the whole pure.

(I) Possession of means of Production and Production Difficulties

"Representative investigations of three villages have yielded the following findings :

"(1) *Poor Peasants and Hired Farm Hands*. This group of peasants obtained an average of 0.91 *mow* of land from agrarian reform. Most of them have surplus labour; the greater majority of them had in the past relied upon secondary occupations to supplement their incomes. Economically they can be divided into three categories. In the first category,

there are 11 families, or 12.2 per cent of the number of families investigated, who have the greatest economic difficulties. If the Government does not give them substantial aids, they will be in danger of bankruptcy. The second category consists of 58 families, 64.4 per cent of the total families investigated. The economic position of these families has begun to improve but difficulties still remain. Most of them previously had a small amount of land or rented lands. *They did not lose or gain much during agrarian reform.* They generally have some shortage of means of production or owe some debts. The third category consists of 21 families, 23.3 per cent of the number of families investigated. These families have improved their economic situation and have approached the standard of living of middle peasants. Most of them owned some land previously or rented lands. Generally they have sufficient farming tools.

“(2) *Middle Peasants.* Judging by landholding, middle peasants own more land than poor peasants. In one village where there are 26 middle peasant families with 121 persons, the aggregate landholding is 163.1 *mow* of land, averaging 1.35 *mow* per head (against an average of 0.9 *mow* for poor peasants). These peasants have enough farming tools. In standard of living there are seven families which live somewhat better, having both money and food to spare. Some 17 families are average middle peasants who generally do not owe debts or lack food. There are two families, one widow family and one having had sick people and funeral expenses to meet, who *do not have sufficient food* or farming tools.

“(3) *Rich Peasants.* There were at first 36 families or rich peasants in this locality; three families have since moved away. The 160 members of these 33 families own a total of 246.7 *mow* of land, averaging 1.54 per head. They have more farming tools (including draft animals) than the middle peasants. *These families are in an extremely unsettled mood for production.*

“(4) *Landlords*. There were originally 44 landlord families in this locality, six of whom have moved away owing to the building of embankments. Now there are 38 families with 181 persons, holding an aggregate total of 152.85 *mow* of land, averaging 0.84 per head. These landlords were given no draft animals or farming tools during agrarian reform so that they now have to borrow them from the peasants.

(II) Misgiving of Various Peasant Strata and Production Activities.

“(1) *Poor Peasants and Hired Farm Hands*. In our discussion with 32 poor peasants and hired farm hands, we found three different kinds of reactions. The first category has faith in Socialism and has some preliminary understanding as to why Socialism can only be reached gradually through the organization of peasants and the mutual-aid co-operation. *This category consists of three peasants, one of them a committee member of the Peasants' Association, one the deputy secretary of the local Youth League Branch, and the third a Youth League Member.*¹ The second category of 23 persons are interested blindly in seeking prosperity. This type of peasant holds a strong position among the ranks of poor peasants and hired farm hands. Most of them have good capacity for labour and have benefited by agrarian reform. *They have no clear ideas of Socialism, nor great faith in it.* The third category consists of six persons who have an inclination towards ‘Agricultural Socialism’. They are either impoverished weaklings or senile persons, or *single* persons (orphans widows etc.,) or people with limited capacity for labour and heavy family burdens. These people have mistaken notions of Socialism and are not active in production, seeking merely to find solutions for their own difficulties and desiring immediately to eat from the communal pot of rice (Communism).

1. All peasants having faith in “Socialism” are members of the Communist Party and its branch organisations.

“(2) *Middle Peasants*. The more or less widespread dissemination of ‘Agricultural Socialism’ in the villages has greatly obstructed the production activity of the middle peasants, especially the better-off among them. *There is a common misgiving of being identified as rich and classified into higher rank*. Most of them merely want to live from day to day, from hand to mouth. They do not have the active attitude of attaining prosperity through industry and austerity. Of the 18 families of middle peasants investigated this time, 15 were found to cherish this attitude. *They hesitate to invest in production and are not active in pursuing secondary occupations*. They take no keen interest in the organization of mutual aid, and joined it only because they wanted loans of fertilizers and *because they did not want to be called bad persons*. Some of them, especially the upper middle class peasants, like to spend their money fast on food and drink. *They do not dare to hire labor or lend out money for interest*. One middle of peasant who has not got labor, leased out his land without demanding rentals, wanting only the lease to pay the grain tax. *Lending and borrowing relations still remain dormant in the villages. A more common misgiving arises from the fear of burden (i.e. the graintax)*.

“(3) *Rich Peasants*. The rich peasants *look forward to the reinvestigation of agrarian reform with fear. Their activity for production is unsettled*. They commonly do not dare to hire labor or to put out land to lease. Of the 33 rich peasant families in the *bsiang*, only one hires a part-time laborer, and this family itself has no available labor. Only three rich peasant families hire occasional help; one of them does so because its own laborer is ill; two families do so by order of the Peasants’ Association. Thus although according to their land-holdings they require help, they do not dare to employ it. Nor do they dare to put out their land to lease. Even when they lease a part of their land, they do not collect rentals. This is in fact a form of ‘offering land.’ Their investment in production is also meager.

Among the 35 rich peasant families only 22 bought a total of 3,060 catties of bean-cakes, averaging 140 catties per family. This is only one-third of the pre war investment. *The lands owned by the rich peasants are generally not in as good condition as the land of the generality of peasants.*

“(4) *Landlords.* The landlords may be divided into three groups. The first group attends comparatively well to production and is law-abiding. This group consists of eight families, 20 per cent of the landlord class in the *hsiang*. The second group, consisting of 24 families or 61.5 per cent of the landlord class, are not active in labor production but have not perpetrated conspicuously destructive activities. The third group, consisting of seven families or 18 per cent of the landlord class, has openly carried but sabotage and resisted reform through labor. These lawless landlords have been struggled against and have been compelled to submit to mass surveillance.

(III) ORGANIZATION OF MUTUAL-AID.

“When the *hsiang* passed from agrarian reform into the phase of production, a general appeal for the organization of mutual-aid was made. Altogether 85 mutual-aid groups, consisting of 509 peasant families have been formed. Of this number of peasants, 339 families are poor peasants and hired farm-hands, making 67 per cent of the total number of poor peasants and hired farm-hands, 168 families are middle peasants; this constitutes 47 per cent of the total number of middle peasants. These organised families make up 41.5 per cent of the total number of families in the *hsiang*.

“These mutual-aid groups have played a great part on the production front, but there has been a major problem. *The policy of equitable exchange of labour and mutual benefit has not been fully followed. Most mutual-aid groups have not kept records of contributions of labour and credits for various services.* People

who lost out in the exchange of labour could not help feeling that it was not worthwhile. Some people felt that since 'the communal rice pot' would come into force in some two years' time, it did not matter much to lose out in labour exchange at present. *There has also been a tendency towards absolute egalitarianism, giving full credit of labour to men, women and children alike.* There has also been excessively high or excessively low assessment of wages for labour, so that those who lack labour or have surplus labour do not get a fair deal."¹

For the benefit of those peasants (and they from a majority of the Chinese peasant population) who have wrong notions about "Socialism", Chen Ta-Kao wrote an article under the heading "The Incompatibility of Socialism and Egalitarianism". We reproduce some portions of it :

"We often hear people in the rural villages say that 'in collective farms there is no difference in ownership; what you have belongs to me and what I have belongs to you,' that 'when the stage of Communism comes, one can work, eat and take what he likes,' and that 'in collective farms, people eat from same pot of rice and dress the same kind of clothes.' Such sayings obviously *misinterpret Socialism and Communism as egalitarianism.* When the Chinese Peasants, Delegation visited the Soviet Union, the members saw personally the truth of the collective farms and realized that the happy life is inseparable from labour and that *Socialism is not egalitarianism.*

"The years of experiences accumulated by the Soviet have made it possible for them to devise a complete set of scientific method. *They have adopted the piece-work wage system for the purpose of fair and reasonable distribution.* How much land each person should till or plow per day and how much grain should be reaped on each hectare are all fixed by the district Soviet and the farm Soviet on the basis of government directives and in accordance with the actual local conditions, to be discussed and passed by a farm-member meeting.

1. Hankow *Ch'ang Ching Jih Pao*, September 20, 1952.

“The method of computation of remuneration for labour as adopted by the collective farms in the Soviet Union *has completely shattered the idea of egalitarianism*. Model peasant of Northern Kiangsu Chao Fu-ya said : ‘The loafers of our place are waiting for ‘Socialism’ while the middle peasants fear ‘Socialism.’ Both of them look at Socialism in the light of egalitarianism.’

“Li Shun ta stated: ‘In the new society, lazy bones will have no way out. The collective farms fix for each able-bodied person the lowest quota. If the number of working days done is not up to the lowest quota set for the year, *varying penalties will be meted out* as circumstances may require. In minor cases, expulsion from the farm will be ordered (when passed by the meeting of the entire farm members). In case of wilful violation of labour discipline, *the person concerned will be subject to forced labour* (i.e., 40 percent of the remuneration from his labour is kept by the Government and 60 percent paid to him.)’

“Some of our co-operative leadership cadres also worry that they have to lead the production work and also take part in the field work and that now they find themselves already busy enough leading the cooperatives, but how they are going to manage it when large collective farms are set up and they are elected Chairman. If they had visited the Soviet Union, they would understand that when a collective farm is set up, *the leadership work for the organization of production will be stupendous when the chairman of the farm will have to devote himself to brain-work and do no more brain work*. The income (or working days) of the chairman will be fixed according to the acreage of land tilled, the number of cattle reared and the number of fowls raised by the farm as well as its total income. If the total income of the farm exceeds the target, *the wages of the chairman will be increased* accordingly in percentage (to 100 percent at most). Besides, when the cash income of the whole farm exceeds 1 million roubles, then the *chairman of the farm will get an additional cash remuneration of 400 roubles monthly*. *His wages will increase according to the length of service*.

After three years of service, he will get a 5 percent increase, after 4-5 years, 10 percent, after 5 years 15 percent. The chief of a field team and the chief of a breeding station, *who also do not directly engage in production*, are paid according to the area of land under his supervision, the number of cattle, and the quantity production. The agricultural and husbandry of *experts, the veterinary doctor, and the accountant*, if they are members of the farm, get a remuneration generally about 75-80 percent of that of the chairman, but when the farm's target of production is overfulfilled *they will be given material rewards* but no additional working days. If such experts are invited from the outside, a different contract and remuneration will be fixed. *The chairman, chiefs and experts are all very important to the farm, as their work has a direct bearing upon the farm state of production, and therefore, their remuneration should be higher than the average farms members.* Many agricultural production co-operative chiefs and model workers said, 'Seeing the way the chairman of collective farms in the Soviet Union work and are remunerated, all our misgivings have been dispelled. We must lead well our farm work and learn well skills. We will have a bright future so long as we cater to the needs of the nation and the masses.'¹

We can now clearly understand that under collectivised agriculture, the greatest beneficiaries would be the Chairmen of collective farms and the various experts and "brain workers." This is the new managerial class which Communism creates everywhere and through which the cities establish their exploitative hold over the country-side. We find the whole strategy explained in a Chinese newspaper in the following words:

"Although the Party will transfer large forces to industry and to the cities, rural work remains to be strengthened and will pursue the following four lines:

1. Peking *Jen Min Pao*, September 14, 1952.

“(a) To conclude agrarian reform and to develop the Party; to organize measures for transforming agrarian reform into the phase of production;

“(b) To transfer gradually rural cadres of senior standing, each *hsien* to retain a few seasoned cadres of *hsien* level, so that a nucleus of experienced men will remain ;

“(c) to mark out certain counties and districts in each province as key areas in which to carry out experiments and to train new cadres ;

“(d) to clarify the idea of shifting gravity of work to the cities. It does not mean that everybody will go to the cities to take part in industrial construction.

“Only when the party has established organizations in the countryside will it be possible to consolidate the People's Democratic Dictatorship in the villages and to ensure the fulfilment of new economic construction tasks.

“The Youth League, the Militia, the Peasants' Association, the People's Representatives Conference, will all be strengthened during Party development. ‘When the *hsaing* party branch is there, when the Party's auxiliary organization (the Youth League) is there, when the political power based on the system of people's Representatives Conference is there, when the Peasants' Association is there, and when the Militia, *pillar of support to political power*, is there, the Party will have on the whole completed its tasks of organizing the masses during the period of rural agrarian reform.

“It is true to say that the Peasants' Association, while being strengthened at present, *will eventually die out*, but it would be wrong to conclude that the temporary inactivity to the Peasants's Association means that its functions have been exhausted and that it should be eliminated immediately. The correct course to take is to strengthen it and to prevent it from lapsing into inactivity.

“The common interest of all organizational work is to maintain the class spirit. The class spirit must be based on the foundation of mass class awakening and *class awakening is enhanced through internal and external struggles of various natures*. Previously, we emphasized attacking the landlord class and solving the land question, thereby enhancing the mass awakening. During re-examination (of agrarian reform) *it will be further enhanced by wiping out the influences of landlord feudal ideology.*”¹

It seems that the Peasants' Associations are transitional organizations. They will not be needed after “People's Democratic Dictatorship” has been consolidated. Nor is the “class-struggle” supposed to end after the landlord class has been destroyed. It will be further “enhanced” to wipe out “feudal ideology” which, unfortunately, means the independence of the peasantry to lead its own life. The surest way to take away the peasant's independence is to make him dependent on the cities.

It is also clear from the above discussion that not only the landlord, but also the rich peasant are treated as “outsiders” by the Chinese Communists. Whenever, the communists talk of the “rich peasants” they always add the phrase “in the present situation” or “at this stage” implying thereby that they have in mind some other “situation” and “stage”. We know that in Russia also the “rich peasants” were allowed to fatten before they were slaughtered as a class. In Russia, these peasant who were called kulaks constituted about 5,85,000 human beings. In China, according to the Communist statistics the “rich peasants” constitute 6 percent of the population which means 23 million² people facing death and deportation in near future.

1. Hankow *Ch'ang Chiang Jih Pao*, November, 1952.

2. China's Economic Problems, Page 10, People's Publishing House Ltd., Bombay, 1920.

IV

TOWARDS IMPERIALIST INDUSTRIALISATION

The dream of the communists is absolute power for themselves based on the slogan of the “Dictatorship of the Proletariat” and guaranteed by the Dictatorship of Industry over Agriculture and of cities over the countryside. They imagine their utopia in terms of a proletarianised mass cut off from private means of production, brought about by confiscation of land, and large-scale, centralised industrialisation. Only a mass of people dependent for their livelihood on the state-owned means of production can be thoroughly enslaved by a clique which controls the state. Collectivisation is the road to guarantee political power, socially and economically. According to Lenin :

*“Socialism is inconceivable, without the technique of large-scale capitalist industry based on upto-date science. It is inconceivable without planned state organisation which subjects tens of millions of people to the strictest observance of a single standard in production and distribution. We Marxists have always insisted on this, and it is not worthwhile wasting two seconds talking to people who do not understand even this. At the same time, Socialism is inconceivable unless the proletariat is the ruler of the state.”*¹

1. Lenin : Selected Works, Vol. II, Part II, Mowcow, 1951, Page 705.

The second reason for collectivisation is to extract sufficient “surplus value” from the peasantry to finance the communist plan of industrialisation. Stalin gave the *raison d'être* of collectivisation in the following words :

“The Marxian theory of reproduction teaches that modern society cannot develop without accumulating from year to year and accumulation is impossible unless there is expanded reproduction from year to year. This is clear and comprehensible. Our large-scale, centralized, Socialist industry is developing according to the Marxian theory of expanded reproduction; for it is growing in volume from year to year, it has its accumulations and is advancing with seven-league strides. But our large-scale industry does not constitute the whole of our national economy.”¹

Preobrazhensky, and outstanding Soviet economist, has put the whole policy in the form of a law :

“The more economically backward, petty-bourgeois, and agricultural a country passing over to the socialist organisation of production is, the smaller the heritage which the proletariat of the country receives from the fund of its socialist accumulation at the moment of the Social Revolution, the more will socialist accumulation be forced to rely on the *exploitation* of the pre-socialist economic forms (i.e., the agriculture) and the lower will be the specific gravity of accumulation in its own production of the workers employed in socialist industry. And *vice versa*, the higher the economic and industrial development of a country in which the Social Revolution is victorious, the greater the material heritage in the form of highly developed industry and capitalist agriculture which the proletariat of that country receives from the bourgeoisie at the moment of nationalisation, the smaller the specific gravity of the pre-capitalist form of production in that country, and the more the proletariat of the country has to eliminate inequality in the exchange of its products

1. Problems of Leninism, Page 303, Moscow, 1942.

for colonial products, i.e., to eliminate the exploitation of the latter—the more will be the centre of gravity of socialist accumulation be transferred to the industrial base of the socialist forms, the more will it rely on the surplus product of its own industry and its own agriculture.”¹

In China the “fund of socialist accumulation” is lower than it was in Russia at the time of the Revolution and the exploitation of the peasantry must, therefore, go further than in Russia.

The exploitation of agriculture by industry has already made a remarkable progress. The Chinese newspaper *Nan Fang Jih Pao*, published from Canton reported in its issue of February, 1953 the following facts :

“Price ratios between industry and agricultural products are essentially a question of prices that the peasants have to pay for their necessities. The peasants remarked that in the field of production materials, fertilizers cost an equivalent of 118 catties of grain per picul before the liberation ; now they cost 262 catties of grain. Cakes of sesame husks used to cost 118 catties of grain per picul before the liberation; now they cost 150 catties. Bean-cakes have gone up in price, and farming tools are also much too expensive. A plough used to cost 18 catties of grain; now it costs 40 catties. In the field of daily necessities, in the past one picul of grain could be converted into four suits of coarse cloth; now it fetches only two suits. Salt, Kerosene, edible oil, salt fish and tobacco have *all become much more expensive than before.*”

It is also plain that the Chinese communists do not see any possibility of readjustment between agricultural and industrial prices before industrialisation is “completed”. The same paper explains :

1. Socialism & Peasantry by Asoke Mehta, Pages 21-22, PSP, Bombay 1953.

“Owing to the restricted industry in our country, the price of industrial products are comparatively high. There is *little possibility of readjustment of industrial prices owing to our plan of industrial construction*. It is only when industry has been developed, its output increased and costs reduced, that the price differences between industrial and agricultural products can be reduced.”

In fact, the peasants are being accused of selfishness and asked to observe austerity. The same paper exhorts :

“According to investigations in various *hsiang*, many peasants are spending far more money to improve their livelihood than on production after land reform. For the immediate purpose of increasing production and for the peasants’ long-term interests, it is essential to advocate austerity. The peasants should be made voluntarily to cut down unnecessary expenses in an appropriate way. The cadres should first of all clear their own minds on the principle of increasing production and practising austerity. Only then would it be possible to foster a good atmosphere.”

And for a long time to come, the communists have no intention of producing what the peasant wants. The official Chinese papers *Ta Kung Pao* published from Hongkong reported in its issue dated November 27, 1952 the reasons against light industry :

“Some people are of the opinion that since our purchasing power has been greatly increased, we can immediately open more factories for weaving cotton cloth, and manufacturing soap, matches, rubber shoes, paper. Why should we busy ourselves by opening mines and steel and iron mills ? This is wrong. In order to manufacture such machineries, we must have plenty of iron, steel, coal, coke, electric power, and machine tools. Factors required by the peasants are also just these. If steel, coal, coke, electric power, and machinery for manufacturing tractors are not available, no tractor can be made.

“Some people asked whether it would be possible to start on both ends without assigning any priority. This is impossible. *If our efforts are dissipated to build up the light industry, instead of concentrating on heavy industry, no industrial foundation can be achieved after spending eight or ten years, and no problem can be solved.*”

“Although the capital construction of heavy industry is very troublesome, yet problems can thus be fundamentally solved.”

“When we have done a good job of heavy industry, it also means the strengthening of the national defence forces of the fatherland.”

Thus while the peasants clamour for more cloth and kerosine and such like things, the communist bosses are bent upon giving them tractors so that they may better slave for the “socialist economy.” Tractors and Farming Machinery Stations are being set up in major Chinese cities to ensure the peasant’s dependence on the cities. *New China News Agency* dated March 29, 1953, reported as follows :

“The Peking Tractor and Farming Machinery Stations, the first of ten to be established this year in the country, has begun its spring work.

“The Station has made contracts with four state farms, one collective farm and two agricultural producers’ cooperatives. During the spring sowing this year, it will plough some 430 hectares, harrow over 1,260 hectares and sow more than 1,000 hectares of land. By autumn of this year, it is expected that the station will be able to apply mechanized farming to at least two thousand hectares.

“The Station was set up in January, talking over the work of the former Peking tractor station. More equipment has been added. It now has 16 Soviet tractors and many other up-to date farm machines. Its

leading personnel were given special training to keep them abreast of new developments.

“9 other similar Stations will be set up this year, two each in North China, Northeast and East China, and one each in Central-South, Northwest China and Inner Mongolia.

“These stations are experimental. Their purpose is to accumulate practical experience in the establishment of tractor and machine stations, to turn out efficient managers and skilled technicians in the sphere of mechanized farming, and to show the peasantry the advantages of mechanized farming. They will pave the way for the mechanization of agriculture in the future.”

Another such report from the same source came out on April 26, 1953:

“Rising output on China’s farms would be impossible without the substantial aid rendered by the industrial workers.

There are now sixty big farm tools and machinery factories turning out large quantities of equipment of improved design. In the Northeast, every province has one or two state-operated farm tool and machinery factories and practically every county has one state-operated farm tool factory. Last year alone, Northeast peasants were provided with 300 sets of horse-drawn improved farm tools. And in the coming five years, the North-east workers will supply the peasants with a further 170,000 sets so that more than 9 million hectares of farmland on the plains will be worked entirely with more efficient equipment.

“A total of 320,000 improved farm tools have been put out by the North China Agricultural Machinery factory alone during the past three years. The workers of this factory have steadily perfected their products and made them cheaper.

“Water wheels, well drilling machines, insecticides and chemical fertilizers are another side of the great aid rendered by Chinese workers to farms production.”

The peasants would have not only to pay exorbitant prices for these farm implements (which do not add to the productivity of land as is evident from the Soviet Russian experiment) but also for managers and skilled technicians.

A major goal of China's “Socialist Economy” is the building of a “defence” system. Speaking before the National Committee of the People's Consultative Conference on September 30, 1950, Chou-En Lai said :

“China has been an important target of the imperialist brigands of aggression. The victorious Chinese people, therefore, cannot be without a mighty national defence force to protect themselves. We must intensify the building of our national defence force to protect ourselves. We must intensify the building of our national defences in good time, and always be on guard against the plots of the imperialist enemies to extend their aggressive war. We must build up a powerful people's air force and navy, so that we may be able to beat back the armed robbers from the air and sea and protect our territorial air and waters from infringement. Our people's ground forces must be strengthened continuously so that they can defeat any aggressor.”¹

The Chinese peasants must pay for Red China's imperialist ventures. For, the Communist conception of self-defence is more or less co-equal with world domination. The communists will continue to feel “threatened” so long as a single non-communist country exists around them. To them defence means the invasion of other countries and the setting up of puppet governments. China's “aspirations” in this direction have already become manifest in Tibet, Korea and Indo-China.

1. The First Year of Victory, Page 4, Foreign Languages Press, Peking.

V

GRAIN PRODUCTION & COLLECTION

We have discussed above one of the main reasons for collectivisation of agriculture in communist countries, namely, capital formation for the purpose of rapid industrialisation. We have also discussed the political need of collectivisation for consolidation of communist dictatorship. Now, we shall discuss a very important aspect of collectivisation namely, grain collection. This is a permanent curse for any communist society. The communists have to maintain increasingly large numbers of urban population and the feeding of these people is a government responsibility in a country where free market for grain does not exist. Collectivisation alone can guarantee a continuous supply of grains at prices which do not jeopardize industrial profits. The free peasants tend to consume themselves quite a part of the grains or part with it at prices which they can exact. If the peasant retained this freedom, the whole communist "economy" would collapse like a house of cards.

Before we pass on to the main question of grain-collection, we should like to discuss the overall grain production in China about which there has been so much fuss in India. It is a question of comparing current figures of production, imports and population with the corresponding figures in pre-Japanese war days. The communists also relate their percentages of increase and decrease in production with the years 1931-36 which are treated as base years.

According to the pamphlet *General Conditions of Grains Situation of the Nation*, issued by the Nationalist Government in September 1947, the average overall production of grains in 1931-36 was 140 million tons. According to the same source, production fell to 134 million tons in 1946, so that China had to import 8.7 million tons in 1946-47 to meet her total needs. This gives us a figure of 142.7 million tons which more or less corresponds with total consumption in 1931-37. For we have evidence that China used to import food-stuffs from abroad in the pre-Japanese war days also. According to official Communist sources:

“In 1932, a total of 2,240,000 tons of grains were imported. Because of the amount of grain imported and the readjustment of grain supply, the food shortage was overcome, but in many provinces there developed the phenomenon of peasants being adversely affected by the fall in grain prices. The figures of imported grain should be regarded as important reference material for calculating the grain supply this year.”¹

But even after imports had been brought in, the per-capita consumption must have declined in 1946-47 as compared to 1931-37 due to increase in population. The demands of the people in China, however, had become flexible as the following statement indicates :

“With regard to the consumption of food, because of the poverty brought about by prolonged warfare, there is elasticity in the people’s food consumption. In times of high grain prices people generally eat coarser cereals and cook them with more water.”²

The production of grains declined further in 1947. According to a communist document, *General Policy of Chinese Communist Party Freedom Front*, volume V No. 4

1. China Wins Economic Battles, Page 20, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1950.

2. Ibid, Page 21.

dated April, 1951, the overall grain output in China during 1947 amounted to 127.5 million tons. The lowest point was reached in 1949, when the communists won a long civil war and established their authority on the mainland of China. According to *New China News Agency*, Peking September 26, 1952 :

“The total grain output in 1951 was 28% higher over 1949 and total grain output this year is expected to be 40% higher over 1949 and to exceed the peak level before the Anti-Japanese war by 9%”. (The Great Victory of Agrarian Reform Movement in the Past Three Years by Lio Lu-yen, *Deputy Secretary General of GAC*).

After reducing these figures we find that if the grain production was 100 in pre-Japanese war years, it dwindled to 78 in 1949, rose to 96.8 in 1951 and was expected to be 109 in 1952.

Another report in Canton *Nan Fang Jih Pao*, dated September, 23, 1952 says:

“In the sphere of agriculture, total agricultural output in 1951 has been restored to 92.8% of pre-war peak levels, and total grain output this year is expected to surpass the peak level in our history. Now, we have grain surplus and are self-sufficient in cotton.” (Great Achievements of the People’s Republic of China in Past Three Years by Yu Kan).

Here the figure for 1951 is four points lower than in the earlier statement. A report about Kwangtung province contained in Canton *Nang Fang Jih Pao*, October 30, 1952, gives the following figures :

“According to old statistics, the peak of food production in Kwangtung history was 14,400,000,000 catties a year. On the eve of liberation, it dropped to less than 10,000,000,000 catties”. (Preliminary Works &

Plans in the Economic-Financial Field in Kwangtung Province To-day, An Article by Fang Fang, 5th Secretary South China Sub-Bureau Central Committee, Chinese Communist Party).

It means that if the production in Kwangtung was 100 in pre-Japanese war years, it fell to 70% in 1949. This is about 8 points less than the previous figure; but perhaps it is only a local figure and does not represent the average.

According to Li Shu-chen "By 1949, the Year of Liberation, food-production was down of 74.6 per cent of the pre-war level."¹ This gives us approximately 104.44 million tons of food grains in 1949. It should thus be borne in mind when talking about increase of grain production under the Communist regime, that the increase is not absolute, that is, an increase over the highest production in China in past years, but only a relative increase as compared to production in an year when normal life in China had come to a standstill and when all round production had reached the lowest ebb. It is a settled communist practice to choose a very lean year and then compare their "achievements" with it.

According to *North China News Agency Bulletins* dated January 23, and February 19, 1951, the grain production rose to 120 million tons in 1950 and was estimated to be 130 tons in 1951. The figure for 1951 is also confirmed by *People's China* of 16th March, 1952 according to which grain production in 1951 was 92.8% of pre-Japanese war peak output i.e. 92.8% of 140 million tons which comes to 129.92 million tons or approximately 130 million tons.

1. New China's Economic Achievements 1949-52, Page 188. China Committee For the Promotion of International Trade Peking, 1952.

About grain production in 1952 we have contradictory and confusing statements. *People's China* dated 16th March 1952 stated that grain production was expected to rise by another 8% in 1952 and thus attain pre-Japanese war levels i.e. 140 million tons. According to the NCNA report from Peking dated 27th September, 1952, quoted above, the grain production in 1952 was expected to be 40% above 1949 i.e., 145.12 million tons an 1.9% above 1931-37, i.e., 152.6 million tons. The two figures cannot be reconciled. So far we have not been able to obtain definite figures of grain-production in 1952 ; what we have is only estimates of expected production. In any case at the end of 1952 the Chinese Communist could make the following statements :

“Although an agricultural country, China used to import large quantities of foodstuffs and cotton from abroad before liberation. To-day we are entirely self-sufficient in these products and have no need for such imports. Furthermore, we are able to spare part of our own foodstuffs to help neighboring countries out of their difficulties”.¹

It is, however, difficult to believe how this could be possible. Here we have to remember two things: (a) that China's population in 1952 was larger than in pre-Japanese war days and (b) that China used to import large quantities of grain from abroad in pre-Japanese war days, instead of exporting which she has been doing under the communist regime. Regarding population we have the following statement made in 1950 :

“China has a population of 475,000,000—the largest in the world.”²

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1. New China's Economic Achievements, Pages 269 & 274. China Committee For the Promotion of International Trade, Peking, 1952.
 2. China's Economic Problems, Page 2, People's Publishing House Ltd., Bombay, 1950.

In 1952, more definite estimates were available according to the following statement:¹

“The following statistical figures of Chinese population can be considered to be the latest:

East China	140,928,712
Central South	135,775,290
Southwest	70,634,391
North China	67,068,386
Northeast	41,570,678
Northwest	23,471,480
Inner Mangolia Autonomous Region	2,238,625
Tibet	1,00,00
			483,687,862

This population is definitely larger than about 400 million people which pre-Japanese war China had according to all available reports. Thus the slight increase in grain production, that is 9% is more than offset by about 21% increase in population. One could be sure that the per-capita grain consumption in 1952 is considerably lower than it was in 1931-36. Taking the total consumption in 1931-37 to be 142.25 million the per-capita consumption for a population of 400 million was .33 tons per annum. In 1952, it cannot be more than .30 tons per annum, even if we do not take into consideration the exports of foodgrains from China. According to a PTI report towards the end of 1952 the Government of Burma refused a Chinese request for rice in exchange for the fine silk and floss etc., which proved that China was short of food. This conclusion is confirmed by the following statements appearing in

1. Hongkong *Hsin Wan Pao*, Decr. 7, 1952.

the Chinese press in 1953. According to Chungking *Hsin Hua Jih Pao*, March 24, 1953 :

“According to reports received from various localities, at present, spring famine has appeared in parts of 133 *hsien* in the southwest region. Statistics based on reports from 70 spring famine stricken *hsien* show that more than one million people are suffering from food shortage. This shortage is still developing.

“Of late, emergency measures have also been adopted by the various provinces. For instance, in the famine stricken areas in Sikang province, *the campaign for the thorough implementation of the Marriage Law has been temporarily suspended while famine-relief work is being carried*¹ *out as the above-all central task. At present, in some areas, as a result of the importance being attached by the leadership organs and the mobilization of and reliance upon the masses in the thorough implementation of the policy of self-relief through production, famine has been checked or alleviated.*”

According to the same paper dated April 5, 1953:

“In a few areas the *famine situation is continuously developing while the number of people running short of food is likely to continuously increase.* It is necessary that famine relief work should still be strengthened at various localities to wage a struggle against the famine.

“In many areas, in the implementation of the policy of self-relief through production, various means of relief through labour such as railway sleeper-carrying, transport of grain, rice reprocessing, and water conservancy work have been initiated.”

According to *NCNA* Peking, dated April 11, 1953 :

“During the past three years the peasants of our country under the leadership of the Communist Party and the people’s Government have exerted tremendous efforts to step up production of grains. Grain output

1. The reader should know that selling of wives has been an ancient practice of the Chinese peasantry in times of famine.

in our country has not only been restored to the pre-war level but, in some cases, has surpassed that level. *Our country has been transformed from a grain-importing country into a grain-exporting country.* Thanks to the increase in grain output, the livelihood of urban and rural people has been bettered to a certain extent. But it would be entirely wrong to suppose that the food problem of our country has been solved completely and finally. *The so-called pre-war level was actually a very miserable level, the level of agricultural production in a semi-colonial and semi-feudal society, and certainly we have no reason whatsoever to be satisfied with a success which only slightly exceeds this level.*

“Agricultural production in our country is still subject to great restrictions by natural conditions; and while after three years' bumper harvests the peasants begin to build up some reserves for tiding over natural disasters, *no reserve sufficient to conquer any disasters has yet been built up.* Yet this reserve is vitally necessary during the period of economic construction, and without such a reserve the state of *equilibrium between the various branches of national economy is likely to be upset,* and our economic construction will be involved in new difficulties. All this shows that the *food problem is still an urgent problem which has not been finally solved and must be solved. Neglect of this problem will lead to a political mistake.*

“In order to solve the food problem we must take long-range plans to step up production. We must set a direction to take grain production-increase as the leading task on the agricultural production front during the next few years and to bring home to all the vital importance of producing more and better grain. During the past few years there has arisen a 'step up output of industrial crops first' concept among many leading organs, rural cadres and peasants who think that only by developing industrial crops can industry be aided and can peasants' income be increased. Evidently this is a one-sided concept.

“*Promotion of austerity in grain consumption among the consumers,* in co-ordination with the task of stepping

up grain production and building up grain reserves, is also a feasible and useful measure.”

The internal contradictions in this statement are simply astounding. But it proves that the food problem is far from solved. In a police state, however, scarcity and plenty can exist simultaneously and grain can be exported while the people at home keep starving. This the figures of increased production are not reliable is evident from the following statements. Peking *Jen Min Jih Pao*, August 8, 1952 stated:

“In our government organs of various levels, industrial and mining enterprises, and public bodies, owing to the *lack of honest and solemn work style*, and to the *evil tendency of exaggeration*’, a number of working personnel have *submitted false reports* to the leadership organs of upper levels and *even trumped up spurious evidences*. In 1951, according to a report from Hikang in Singkiang province, the Yang Hai-shan yielded 8,000 catties of corn per *shang* on average, and Yang Hai-shan individually yielded 7,000 catties of soya bean per *shang*. But as a result of the practical on-the-spot investigation carried out by the Department of Forestry and Agriculture of the Singkiang provincial government, it was found that the seven households of the unit yielded only 3,140 catties of corn per *shang* on average, and Yang Hai-shan only yielded 3,450 catties of soya bean per *shang*.

“Secretary of the Hsi-ho-wa Tsun Party Committee in Kwangling *hsien* in Chahar province, *intentionally drafted a false plan* for the bumper crop emulation drive in the *tsun*. Without investigation of this false plan, the *hsien* leadership cadres commended the *tsun* as a ‘bumper crop *tsun*’. At the labour model and mutual-aid team leaders’ representative conference held in Kwangling the Hsi-ho-wa *tsun* was commended as a ‘model village’. When the Yenpai special district work team went to investigate recently, this matter was discovered”.

According to NCNA Peking, February 7, 1953:

“The Ministry of agriculture of the Central People’s Government of February 4 issued a notice to relevant organs of the different localities concerning the check-up and disposal of false reports of bumper crop records in certain places.

“The notice first pointed out that the awarding of model peasants for their bumper crops is an important work in agricultural production.

“The notice went on to enumerate a series of instances where false production figures were reported. In submitting its request to the Ministry of Agriculture of the CPG for awards to the units for bumper crop of wheat, the cadres of Hsiangch’eng *hsien*, Honan province, did not go by the stipulated award measures by first surveying the acreage of plantation. Out of the 11 bumper crop units in this *hsien* recommended for awards, 7 units were found to be not up to the standard for awards, after the planting acreage had been corrected. Influenced by the thought of meritism the working cadres responsible for the estimate of yields put the per hectare yield of wheat for Ma Ch’ing fu and Li K’an’s agricultural producers’ cooperatives of Heilunkiang Province at 4,590 and 5,500 catties respectively while the actual yield for Ma Ch’ingfu’s agricultural producers cooperatives was 2,350 catties per hectare and that for Li K’an’s 1700 odd catties.

“In Shansi Province, a report was submitted by Ch’wo *hsien* to the Administrative office that in the Tananchuang *tsun* alone there were 7 households showing a 1,000-catty per *mow* bumper cotton crop records, apart from 3 others in Tali *tsun*. However, subsequent investigations carried out by the inspection groups of the province and the Administrative Office revealed that the highest yield of the bumper-crop cotton grower Ch’ang-ching of Tananchuang was 503.4 catties per *mow*, with Chang Fu-jung second in line showing a record of 439 catties.

“What is even more serious is that the thought of the leadership cadres of certain places was impure, as they prepared false reports in an attempt to gain glory. For instance, the leadership organ of Jushan *hsien*, Honan Province, falsely reported that the Wen Hsiang-lan Agricultural Producers Cooperative of the *hsien* showed bumper crop record of 675 catties of wheat per *mow* for each of its 3 *mow*, in an attempt to steal the honour of production record. The department of agriculture of the Honan Provincial People’s Government, believing in this false report, caused an award to be given to the Wen Hsiang-lan Agricultural Producers Cooperative.”

The Peking *Jen Min Jih Pao* dated February 12, 1953 also explains the motive of submitting false reports in the following words :

“A sign of further development of these errors is to prepare false reports which are not based on facts but are designed to gain the trust of the upper level. *Therefore, their pockets are stuffed with all kinds of materials to cater to the taste of their upper-level.*

“Of course, some of the ‘false reports’ are not entirely without ground. Knowing the great danger involved in having a totally groundless report prepared, some try to find some ‘basis’ or even create several ‘examples’ and magnify them. They fully understand that such ‘examples’ and ‘basis’ do not represent the true conditions, but they do this just to provide some basis for argument when such ‘false reports’ are uncovered.” .

It must also be added here that the credit of increase in grain production after 1949 is wrongly ascribed to itself by the Communist Government of China. Grain production in China did not depend upon Communism. As soon as peace came to the country, the peasants tilled and sowed the land. Even if China was ruled by monkeys, this thing would have happened as soon as peace was restored. If

any credit is to be given it should go entirely to the Chinese peasants. This is an important clarification, because some people in India are confusing food production with communism. In fact the communists in China are a definite hindrance to increase in agricultural production. They do not know even the elements of farming but they have a science, Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism-Maoism, which they practise upon the peasant population. How the peasants are tortured and tyrannised by the Communists is borne out by the following statement:

“The experiences of the reorganization of rural branches of the party have testified to the fact that the problems of corruption and waste exist among members of the party in the rural areas. The most serious problem in the rural areas is bureaucratism, commandism, and *violations of law* and party discipline.

“These elements not only employ the method of *forced commanding in the collecting of grain levies and the mobilization of civilian labour*, but also use the same mistaken methods in the carrying out of such tasks as agricultural production and health campaigns,—tasks which should directly confer benefit on the masses.

“Some *Cb'u* and *hsiang* cadres allotted tasks to the masses on the basis of households, and proceeded to mark the land of the masses with circles, and the masses were *forced to drill wells in accordance with the circles drawn*. There were even cases when market towns were suddenly blockaded, and the people attending the markets detained and forced to work on the wells. The wells thus drilled were generally not usable. In Chucheng *hsien*. More than 20,000 wells were drilled, but less than 5,000 were usable, and less than 300 were actually used.

“Again, in the work of the promotion of the use of improved seeds, in Seshui and other areas, improved seeds were only distributed among the peasants after cotton had been planted, *and they were ordered to*

uproot their plants, those refusing to do so being bound and beaten up by the chiefs of the hsiang. In Tsangshan hsien, even when the cotton plants were bearing fruits and harvesting was approaching the masses were forced to uproot plants over more than 490 mow of land.

“Such incidents were not restricted to Shantung, but were reported from many other areas. Similar cases of forcing people to drill wells were reported from Jehol and Hopei. As a result of the use of force and command in 1952, 5,416 wells were drilled in Ningchin hsein in Hopei, but water was found only in about 1,000 of them. In the Tientsin administrative district, 70,000 wells were drilled, and 40,000 of them unusable.

“Those elements who violated law and discipline have committed even more serious crimes. They scold and beat up the masses, indulge in indiscriminate arrests and detentions, interfere with freedom of marriage, persecute those who would criticize them, wrongly accuse good people, and even shelter counter-revolutionaries, rape women, force people into suicide, and kill people.”¹

Now we can return to the main problem of *Grain Collection*. The Communist Government has a large city population to feed. Here is a statement :

“The amount of public grain alone to be sold on the market this year (including grain to be delivered after the wheat harvest but not including figures for Northeast China) totals 4,500,000 tons. The total urban population in China does not exceed 90,000,000. These 4,500,000 tons can supply one-third of this total urban population with food for a whole year. For the State to move such huge quantities of grain into the cities is unprecedented in the history of China.”²

So, according to decisions promulgated by the Government Administration Council on March 3, 1950:

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1. NCNA Peking, February 9, 1953.
 2. China Wins Economic Battles, Page 23, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1950.

“The amount of public grain to be collected as stated in Section (4) and (5), including the grain surtax collected by the local governments, as well as tax regulations, taxable items and rates of taxation, shall all be *determined and enforced by the Government Administration Council on the recommendation of the Ministry of Finance*. The various local People’s Governments shall not increase, decrease or change them without authorization.”¹

In democratic countries the grain needed by the state is collected at market prices. But in China it seems that peasants cannot get the prices they want. There is no free market and the state is the only buyer of agricultural produce. The state can, therefore, use its monopoly buying position to force the peasants to dispose of grain at arbitrary prices. According to Hankow *Ch’an Chiang Jih Pao*, December 20, 1952:

“On the one hand, the peasants cannot dispose of large quantities of their agricultural produce, and they have no funds to purchase the things they need. On the other hand, the state trading agencies have accumulated large stocks of goods so that industrial products cannot be sent to the rural areas, and the state agencies in turn cannot undertake the purchase on a large scale of agricultural produce.”

The peasants are, therefore, forced to sell their grains. Here is a statement:

“In collecting public grain there were cases of over taxation or under-taxation in different sections of the population. A relatively common phenomenon developed of taxes being levied on too small a category of tax-payers, some of whom consequently had to bear too heavy a burden.”²

1. Ibid, Page 53.

2. China Wins Economic Battles, Pages 40-41, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1950.

The cruelties of grain collection are evident from the following report. The Committee for People's Supervision of the GAC of the Central People's Government issued on January 27, a 'Notice on Strengthening the leadership for Organizing the Delivery of Public Grain to the Granaries.' It said :

"As reported by the Central-South and the South-west Committees for People's Supervision and the Kirin Provincial People's Government, *serious accidents causing deaths of and injury to men and of pack animals have frequently occurred in the course of carrying public grain to the granaries during 1952.* In Kirin Province alone 123 persons and 69 animals died or sustained injury and 51 carts were damaged. Except Huachun *hsien* of this province, which showed a clear record, in the past two years, all the other *hsien* have experienced such accidents more specially Nengan *hsien* where an average of one death occurred for every 4,250 tons of public grain stored in the granaries. In the Central South region, incomplete statistics of Honan, Hunan, Hupeh and Kiangsi revealed that in carrying public grain to the granaries, a toll of 13 lives and 69 cases of injury, apart from 36 head of animals dead or injured, were reported. For Kweichow province, fragmentary statistics showed 57 cases of death or injury in performing the same task.

"Due to the simple preoccupation with speed on the part of the *chu* and *hsiang* cadres to complete the task, they stressed early and quick delivery of grains and forced the peasants, irrespective of their age, strength, health, or even when the peasant women is pregnant, to deliver grains, leading to death and injury."¹

And yet, Dr. Amarnath Jha could say on his return from China that:

"There is plenty of food for every body and even villagers who lived on one meal a day are now taking food *three times* a day."²

1. NCNA Peking, Jan, 27, 1953.

2. National Herald, 19.7.52.

Perhaps Dr. Jha conceived of the peasants of China in the image of our China travellers who eat sumptuous dinners while they see “New Culture” in “New China” as well as while they go about lecturing to ignorant audiences in this country about the “beauties of New China.” But as soon as the Indian people know the truth about Red China’s rice exports and how the peasants in China have to starve and die so that the communist government may secure propaganda points or strategic materials, they will refuse to eat the Chinese rice. *The rice we import from Red China is stained with the blood of the Chinese peasants. It is a sin to eat that rice. Any one who buys that rice, however high may be his public status or political pontification, is a partner in the mass murder of the Chinese peasantry.*

APPENDIX

SERFDOM IN SOVIET RUSSIA

(We give below an outline of the history and pattern of collectivisation in Russia, to show that Red China is being dragged on the same path by the Communists. This summary has been prepared from Sri R. Swarup's unpublished work, *Communism and Peasantry*.)

With the Communist Revolution in Russia, a very sorry chapter began in the life of the peasantry of that country. Their lot was by no means enviable under the Czar, but to the disabilities imposed by Czarism were added the disabilities imposed by Communism.

Lenin said on October 26, 1917, the second day of October Revolution: "We consider that the revolution has proved and demonstrated how important it is that the land question should be stated clearly. The outbreak of armed uprising, the second, or October Revolution, clearly proves that the land must be handed over to the peasants." And explaining this unbolshevik step to the Bolsheviks, he said that "we cannot ignore the decision of the rank and file of the people, even though we may disagree with it."

But very soon, within six months, when he felt more sure of his ground, on February 19, 1918, he published another decree according to which all land including land belonging to the individual peasants was nationalised. It

was nationalisation without confiscation, for the communists were still feeling their way and they were not sure. They had to be cautious, and there had to be a lot of preparation. A decree of February 14, 1918 had already said that individual farming was a transitional form of production to last until collectives were available.

But if it was not safe to touch the land, could they not make a beginning with the produce? And they did. In May, 1918, they issued a decree according to which the peasant households were to give away their "surplus" to the State Purchasing Bodies created for the purpose. Any violation of this order was punishable by imprisonment up to 10 years with confiscation of property. It was promulgated that such people, who resisted this compulsory confiscation "be declared enemies of the people, and be deprived of their rights as citizens of the Republic and be brought before a revolutionary tribunal."

In order to achieve this end, village committees of poor peasants were created in June 1918, whose business was to supervise state requisitions, for which they were entitled to a commission on the basis of supply procured. They were wooed in another way also. The supply of manufactured goods that went to the villages and were meant for exchange against agricultural produce were made over to these committees.

In August 1918, "purveyance detachments" were created. They were armed and their number comprised between 20,000 to 45,000. Later on in 1920, they were "abolished" to be replaced by special military detachments of the Kommissariat for Internal Security to combat against "counter-revolution and speculation".

Meanwhile, the soldiers and labourers had seen something of the Soviet regime and Soviet promises. An armed

revolt broke out amongst the sailors of Kronstadt under the slogan “Soviets without communists and commissars”, partly in revolt against the communist repression and tyranny and partly “in protest against the starvation of the families to which the soldiers and sailors belonged, in the rural villages of the stricken area” (Webbs). Their aim was in their words, “to shake off the communist slavery”, and “throw off the yoke and arbitrary power of the communists, in comparison with which even the yoke of the monarchy fades into nothing”.

It was time that Bolshevik leaders took note of these conditions and called at least a temporary halt to the Bolshevisation of the country. Lenin with a *volte face* so characteristic of him declared the New Economic Policy according to which free enterprise and free trade were restored. Rights of the peasant in the land were recognised and he was free to bring his surplus to the market and sell it at advantageous prices. The New Economic Policy was a transitional measure. But this period was utilised for drawing up ambitious plans of intensive industrialisation, exploring means with which to finance this plan. It was unanimously agreed that it was to be extracted from the peasants. Smooth extraction was possible only by collectivisation of agriculture.

The period between 1929-33 drips with unceasing human blood. The scene opens with a speech by Stalin in the summer of 1929 in which he declared war on the Kulaks and asked the comrades to destroy them ‘as a class’. Besides the OGPU administration, Red Army and the Communist Party members, services of the poor peasantry were also requisitioned for developing “a decisive offensive against the Kulaks”. In ruthlessness these Committees of ‘poor peasants’ were unrivalled. The active support of the

city proletariat and intelligentsia was also enlisted in the task of collectivising agriculture and liquidating the peasantry. The Plenum of the Party Central Committee issued a directive on 17th December, 1929 to organise no less than 25,000 industrial workers for rural work, for strengthening the Kolkhoz movement.

Many people who have no more than an emotional contact with the history of Russian revolution and Soviet regime, believe that the Kulak was a landlord, one of those few thousand top people who ruled over Russia in the Czarist days. The second misconception is that Kulaks were those recalcitrant rich peasants who 'sabotaged' the efforts of the communist government at collectivization. The third misconception is that the policy of liquidation was restricted to one section of the peasantry, known as Kulaks, and did not extend to other sections of the peasant population.

A Kulak, however, was not a landlord. Landlords were removed long before by the peasants themselves without and even inspite of the Communist Party. He was merely a peasant, a little more prosperous than many other peasants as one is taller or smaller than many others without being particularly a giant or a pigmy. And the liquidation and deportation included besides the Kulaks, hundreds of thousands of those poor peasants who resisted governmental confiscation of their land and produce, however small.

Repression led to resistance, resistance led to still greater repression, till the whole country was in the throes of a civil war. But it was a civil war in which the two powers were very unequal. On one side were the repressive organs of the State, a fanatic and disciplined party, held together by idealism, bribes of money, position and power

in the Party, common fear of the OGPU and mutual fear of each other; on this side were also swift weapons of destruction—pistols, and machineguns—and other repressive agencies—prisons and Siberia. On the otherside were the disorganised peasants, without a common platform or party, without any corporate existence through which they could express themselves. Their only weapon was sullenness and anger and hatred in their hearts, which broke out spontaneously and locally.

The Government took away what the peasants produced and stocked as surplus. The peasants in their turn, limited their sowing to the barest minimum, just sufficient to meet their own needs. The Government retaliated by confiscating most of what was sown. Famine ensued. Soviet Government denied the famine at the time it was rampant, but later on in 1935 made an admission of its occurrence. There were seventeen million deaths, 8 million caused by the famine and 9 million by political repression pure and simple.

During the days of enforced collectivization, livestock died by the millions, the same as human beings. A sharp decline of live-stock population is shown below:-

	<u>1928</u>	<u>1934</u>
Horses (million)	33.5	15.7
Cattle	70.5	42.4
Sheep & Goats	146.7	51.9
Pigs	<u>26.0</u>	<u>17.4</u>
	276.4	127.4

Loss : 149.3 million heads.

Loss in livestock, seriously affected food, clothing and shoes, both directly as well as indirectly, Milk, butter,

meat, leather and wool, things directly derived from animal population became still more scarce. It affected their supply indirectly as well. Organic manure become less available with very bad effect on the fertility of the soil. And curiously enough, though the fact is not appreciated, even the traction power at the disposal of the farmers decreased inspite of all the fanfare about the tractors.

Economically, the peasant became a serf, working for a party clique in control of all the repressive agencies of the state, getting for his labour a pittance wage to perpetuate his life. The peasant has to pay many kinds of charges, to the government in kind and money; to the Motor-Tractor Stations whose service he is forced to employ; to the collective of which he is forced to be a member. What is left over after these impositions are met is as a rule 25% of the total produce to be shared among the peasants, mechanics, drivers and officials.

N. Vozesensky writing in *War Economy*, a Moscow Publication, boasts that "in pre-revolutionary Russia 22% to the total marketable surplus of grain belonged to the landlord, 50% to the kulaks, and only 28% to the bulk of the peasantry, the middle and poor peasantry." In the U.S.S.R. on the eve of the late war, about 10% of the marketable grain was produced by the State and nearly 90% by the collective farms. It means that 90% of the total marketable grain was now extorted out of the vast poor peasantry constituting the collectives at nominal price—90% of double the marketable production of 1913. It means that the poor peasants now pay out about 6 times the grain they did in 1913, at prices, calculated in term of manufactured goods, many times lower than in 1913.

All those who have shown more than an ideological interest in Russian affairs and have been closely studying them are agreed that the living conditions of the peasantry have appreciably deteriorated since the Revolution, except for a brief period on the eve of collectivisation in 1928. It is not difficult to show it on the basis of figures provided by the Soviet authorities.

The conclusion that the economic condition of the peasantry has suffered a deterioration under the Bolshevik regime is confirmed by the peasants who remember the old days and who are in a position, for one reason or another, to tell the story. Here is the testimony of Nikolai Koval representing millions like him, who was taken a prisoner by the Germans and who chose to stay away. It is the testimony of an illiterate person, reduced to the written record by the author of "*13 WHO FLED*":

“Before collectivisation I owned two sheds, a lean-to, and a two-room hut. Afterwards I was left with the hut and one shed. The rest was taken away for collective property.

“Before the revolution, I had twentyseven acres of land. No one interfered with me. I lived well. Collectivization took away my land, my property, and farming implements. It was just possible to stay alive. Before the revolution I used to sell three thousand to four thousand pounds of grain on the market. I also sold pigs and calves. With the Kolkhoz I did not even have things for myself.

“The provisions which we received from the Kolkhoz lasted us only about six months, and the rest of the time we existed on grain rejected by the government because of poor quality, different seeds, weeds and grass. This was not food—just a makeshift arrangement.”

Andre Gide, one of the greatest European writers, once an admirer of Russia had to revise his opinion after his visit to the "Wonderland". He testifies to Russian poverty. He says, "I happened to visit a model collective—it is one of the finest and most prosperous in the Soviet Union—and I went into several of the houses. I wish I could give some conception of the uniformly depressing impression which is communicated by each of the dwellings, with a total absence of individuality. In each there are the same ugly pieces of furniture, the same picture of Stalin, and absolutely nothing else",

While the Russian Government suffers from an excess of what are called production goods, the Russian people suffer from a lack of consumption goods. They have tractors, implements, agronomists and other machines and mechanics but hardly an increase of land-produce which will even remotely justify those expenses. They have coal in order to produce iron, and iron, to produce coal, but people suffer from a shortage of fuel and nails. In short, the country suffers from a system of production which is self-feeding and self-consuming.

These machines add to a peasants's idle hours and add to his costs, without adding to the productivity of the land or the amount of land cultivated. This makes him save time of which he has plenty and spend money of which he is short. In the countryside, unemployment reigns supreme. Unfortunately, there are no handicrafts in Russia worth the name, which are a useful and profitable supplement to agriculture elsewhere. They were abolished to make room for large-scale city industries. The net result is that the villager does not have sufficient work.

The rigours of poverty are still more increased by the fact that there is a rich minority which lives in unheard-of riches and luxury. There are several kinds of inequalities—inequalities between (1) city and village, (2) between different collectives, and (3) within the collectives, between collectivised households.

This inequality has little to do with difference in personal efforts and capacity, but is artificially created and maintained by the government through its power to manipulate prices, wages etc.

This is the pattern laid down by the Russian leaders, and practised by them, and the rest of the countries that come under communist domination are bound to follow this pattern.

