

# Kashmir

Disgrace Abounding

Bālāditya

VOICE OF INDIA

# KASHMIR

## Disgrace Abounding

**Bālāditya**

**VOICE OF INDIA**

New Delhi

© AUTHOR

First published:  
December 1991

Published by Voice of India,  
2/18 Ansari Road, New Delhi-110 002.  
Printed at Crescent Printing Works,  
P-14, Connaught Circus, New Delhi-110 001

KASHMIR: DISGRACE ABOUNDING



**KASHMIR**  
**Disgrace Abounding**

**Bālāditya**

**VOICE OF INDIA**  
New Delhi

© AUTHOR

First Published: December 1991  
This Pdf: 2016.

Published by Voice of India,  
2/18, Ansari Road, New Delhi-110 002  
Printed at Crescent Printing Works,  
P-14, Connaught Circus, New Delhi-110 001

## **KASHMIR: DISGRACE ABOUNDING**

If indications in the media are any clue, the government is always threatening to come up with the umpteenth strategy to end the disgraceful state of affairs in the Kashmir Valley. The nation, in its torpor, awaits the latest prescription for disaster written out by quacks who happen to rule the roast.

The demoralisation of the civil administration in the Valley appears to have spread into North Block (Home Ministry) as well. One hears that those very officials whose thankless job it is to initiate policy papers on the insurgency in the Valley, feel no particular commitment towards their task. They are, it is said, weighed down by the feeling that all the donkey-work they do for their superiors, is meaningless because, in the end, decisions will be taken at the top on totally irrelevant considerations. At that level, the ground realities do not matter at all; what matters is the search for a way to resume the game of musical chairs with the same band of corrupt and incompetent politicians, universally hated all over Kashmir, so that this amoral coterie can resume the highly profitable pursuit of plundering Kashmir. The inclusion of a few inconsequential diaspora Kashmiris in the Council of Ministers having failed to produce the slightest effect on the situation, the task of keeping Dr. Farooq Abdullah and his likes contented has suddenly become the prime concern of the decision-makers. Woe betide this nation!

The nation committed its first blunder in letting Jawaharlal Nehru make Kashmir a private fief for himself, his clan, his tribe, and their motley crowd of retainers. Had the fruits of victory not been snatched away from our armed forces at the last moment in 1948, we would not have had the insurgency problem in the Valley to-day. There would not have been any U.N. or UNCIP resolutions; there would not have been any Article 370 in the Constitution; there would not have been any locus standi for Pakistan even in its own estimation; our internal policies would not have been subjected to lunatic distortions for the sake of appeasing a particular minority, which have now put

the unity and the integrity of this nation in peril; our external policies would have been spared the madnesses which have cost us dear and have made us practically a pariah in the international community; and, to-day, we would not have been so gravely threatened by gigantic, international fundamentalist Islamic conspiracy to dismember and balkanise this country. Kashmir would have become as thoroughly and as completely a part of India as is Tamil Nadu, as is West Bengal, as is Tripura, as is Himachal Pradesh, as is Gujarat. Is that precisely what Nehru did not want? And, if so, why? In the slogans raised by the traitorous gangs of insurgents in the Valley, do we not hear an echo of the utopian ideas dreamed up once by Hari Singh and his advisers like Ram Chandra Kak? Nehru approved of decisive military action against Hyderabad; why did he not approve of it in Kashmir? History cannot be unwritten once it is writ, but pondering over these questions may lead to a better understanding of the crisis we face to-day.

### ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM

The turmoil in the Valley has thrown up three names the significance of which seems to have been lost on most people. These are: the Jamaat-e-Islami, the Muslim Brotherhood or Ikhwan Muslimeen, and the Dukhtaran-e-Millat. The three are not different organisations; they branch out from the same stem—the stem of militant Islamic fundamentalism, which is dedicated to the Islamisation of the whole world. The problem with most of our politicians, publicists and policy-makers is that they do not seem to have taken the trouble to acquaint themselves with the nature and the purposes of Islamic fundamentalism, the origin and the growth of organisations like the Muslim Brotherhood in the Muslim countries of the Middle East in conflict with the temporal authorities of those countries, the aims and the objectives of such organisations, their *modus operandi*, and the network they have built up since the 1930s.

The substance of Islamic fundamentalism consists in uncompromising insistence upon every Muslim conducting

himself, in private and in public life, totally and exactly as the Shari'a requires, and consequently upon every Muslim refusing to obey or to conform to any law that does not accord with the Shari'a. In orthodox Islam, the state and religion are inseparable; there can be no secular political or temporal authority which functions independently of the Shari'a. This ideal is manifestly impossible to realise unless Muslims inhabit an Islamic country ruled by a Muslim. Therefore, the ultimate aim of Islamic fundamentalism is to unify all Muslims into one fundamentalist community ruled by a single, supreme Muslim authority. Different fundamentalist organisations may operate differently, but, the ultimate purpose is exactly the same.

#### THE JAMAAT-E-ISLAMI

The inception of Jamaat-e-Islami was in India in 1935 when its founder, Maulana Abul Ala Maududi, started a newspaper and established close contacts with Hassan al-Bana, the founder of Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Both organisations still regard themselves as branches of the same movement—the movement to set up a seventh century Dar-ul-Islam covering the whole world, Maulana Maududi shifted to Lahore in 1937 and remained there till his death. His books and brochures had enormous influence on the Muslim masses in Pakistan as well as in many other poor, developing countries with significant or large Muslim populations. Members and sympathisers of Jamaat-e-Islami occupy vital positions in the Pakistani bureaucracy and armed forces, and also in its politics and academia inspite of on-again off-again ban on the organisation itself.

Maududi's political "line" is totally at variance with the fundamentals of our political convictions, and therein lies the irreconcilable conflict between what the insurgents in the Valley want and what we must adhere to. Maududi talks about "Islamic democracy". In his own words: "The difference between Islamic democracy and Western democracy is, of course, the following: while the latter is based on the conception of the sovereignty of the people, the former is based on the principle of the caliphate

(leadership) by the people, In Western democracy, the people are sovereign; in Islam, sovereignty rests with God, and the people are his caliphs or subjects. In the West, the people themselves make the law; in Islam, the people must follow and obey the laws that God communicated through his prophets. In one system, the government carries out the will of the people; in the other, the government and the people together must translate God's intention into deeds." Needless to say, in all this, God is the God of Islam, and the laws are the Shari'a.

Maududi makes his ideas quite clear. "A better designation for the Islamic political order would be 'the kingdom of God', which in the West is usually called 'theocracy'..... The entire Muslim population guides the state in accordance with the book of God and with the example of His Prophet's manner of conduct." (In a country with a literacy rate of 20%, the entire population in this context can only mean the Jamaati ulema.)

In the organisational machinery of the Jamaat-e-Islami, the primary unit is mosque with the Maktab and the Madrassa-al-talim-al-Qur'an, attached to it. The propaganda literature comes to the Imam or the Mullah, and its contents are planted in the young minds which attend the Madrassa. The children take the teachings home and repeat them to their parents. Gradually, the parents begin to get influenced, receive the literature directly, and a significant number become Jamaat activists or adherents. The primary target areas are the poorer classes, and the lower grade civil servants. Eventually, a situation develops in which there are Jamaat activists in every rung of the administration, the educational institutions and the professions. Without winning any seats in the legislature, Jamaat can thus influence both action and policy. In order to avoid or deflect detection, the organisation gives its branches different appellations, e.g. the Peshawar branch goes by the name, Idara Ahyaal Uloom. The Jamaat-e-Islami has not disappeared from this country. It certainly functions in Kashmir. It must be functioning under different names at other different places. The existence of such "cells" must be within the knowledge of the Intel-

ligence Branches of the State governments. What are they doing to uproot and destroy these poison-weeds?

The Jamaat-e-Islami and the Ikhwan Muslimeen complement each other. While the involvement of the former in the Valley is understandable both as the prime-mover and the tool of Pakistan's policy, the appearance of the latter gives the situation a highly sinister, infinitely dangerous, and a long-term international dimension. The Ikhwan Muslimeen would not have ventured openly in the Valley had it not considered the area "ripe" for action i.e. an uprising.

### THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD

The Muslim Brotherhood is a secretive and basically underground organisation. It was founded by one Hassan al-Bana in Egypt on March 23, 1928. Its objectives, originally, were two-fold: to rid Egypt of British domination, and to enforce a purified, fundamentalist Islamic order in the place of what al-Bana considered a decayed and degenerated Islam which was the result of foreign ideas, foreign influence and "modernisation" of society. At that time, British Intelligence suspected that Soviet Intelligence was largely instrumental in setting up Hasan al-Bana.

The founder laid down a 7-point credo for the members of the organisation in his work entitled "Confession of Faith of Members of the Muslim Brotherhood". Of particular note are the following: (1) "..... that Islam portrays *a general law for the order of this world and of the beyond.*" (4) "I believe that the Muslim is responsible for his family..... *I vow in this sense to do everything possible to impart the Islamic teaching to members of my family: not to send my children to any school that does not teach the morals and faith of the Muslims; to avoid all newspapers, publications, books, organisations, groups and clubs that oppose\* the teachings of Islam.*" (5) "I believe that *a Muslim has the duty of enlivening the fame of Islam by promoting the renaissance of the peoples and restoring Islamic legislation. I be-*

---

\* Meaning "those who refuse to accept."

*lieve that the flag of Islam should rule mankind, and that it is the duty of every Muslim to instruct the world in the rules of Islam. I vow to fight all my life in order to fulfil this mission, and to sacrifice to it everything I own.”* (6) *“I believe that Muslims constitute a single and united great nation that is united by Islam.....”* (7) *“I believe that the secret of the backwardness of the Muslims must be explained by their distance from their religion, that the basis of a reform must consist in returning to the teachings and judgments of Islam. This is possible if the Muslims in this sense are active, and the teachings of the Muslim Brotherhood are directed towards this end. I vow to adhere to these basic tenets to remain loyal towards each person who is active on their behalf and to be soldier and, if necessary, to die in their service.”\** All this was from a man who, at the age of 12, had founded an organisation called the Society for Moral Behaviour which he soon replaced with the Society for Impeding the Forbidden. He and his schoolmates were busy primarily with discovering infractions of the laws of Islam and attacking the culprits with anonymous threatening letters. No comments are necessary on this.

The Muslim Brotherhood does not claim to be a political party; it describes itself as an Islamic Union. This does not make the slightest difference in the organisation and the structure both of which are strictly secret. The various level mostly know nothing of one another, only carefully selected persons are used for maintaining contacts. In all important cases, such contacts are made through couriers. The primary unit of organisation is the family (the *usra*), not in the literal sense but meaning the members of a ‘district’ or territorial unit, who meet every week for readings from the Qur’an, training and discussion. Two such families make a squadron; several squadrons make a branch; and several branches constitute the regions in a country. The leaders of the various countries together make up what is called the International Committee. The actual identities of the members of this Committee are never disclosed.

---

\*Emphasis Supplied.

As this organisation has time and again attracted the wrath and the hostility of practically all the governments in West Asia and North Africa, and its operatives have been subjected to mass arrests and prosecution in many instances, the membership of the International Committee is changed quite frequently. The Egyptian member is always the Supreme Commander of the International Committee in acknowledgment of the origin of the movement in Egypt. This Committee meets whenever there is a reason and generally somewhere in the West in order to avoid arrest by Arab governments. Once it met in Germany. And, as Wilhelm Dietl, the noted German journalist, who ferreted out these details often at the risk of losing his life, notes, the news of a meeting in London in 1978 was leaked out by the Beirut daily 'Al-Safir'. Apart from the Egyptian Supreme Commander, representatives from Syria, the Sudan, Jordan, Pakistan and Afghanistan attended that meeting. Adham, the Saudi intelligence chief, was also reported to have been present.

As is only to be expected, this organisation indulges in a great deal of double-talk and plain deception in order to conceal its real aims behind a mask of pure religiosity. Omar al-Telmisani who succeeded Syed Qutb (successor of al-Bana) as the chief of the Brotherhood, told Dietl: "We continually prove that *our faith includes* not only prayer, sacrifice, pilgrimage and fasting, but *business and politics as well*.\* We have a just system and with that we show that all people are equal, whether the ruled or the rulers, Muslim or non-Muslim..... *We want only to live our Islam*.\* This was obviously based on the assumption that non-Muslims have no knowledge of the Shari'a, a strictly orthodox interpretation of which classifies non-Muslims in an Islamic state as 'dhimmi' who are liable to pay 'jizya' or protection money. How does a Muslim 'live Islam' in a non-Islamic state? Obviously, by securing for himself and his co-religionists a special status as a kind of state within a state. In other words, al-Telmisani visualises an animal farm where Muslims are more equal than others.

---

\*Emphasis Supplied.

Al-Telmisani told Dietl further: “We will pray that people wake up and find the true faith”. What this “true faith” is does not require any identification. This apparently bland statement is a clear avowal of the purpose to make everyone accept Islam. Responding to Dietl’s statement that in the West there was a fear of militant Islam, the same ‘Supreme Guide’ says: “At the most, what exists is a dangerous environment for Islam. We do not topple governments, we commit no assassinations, we have no plans to murder. It is not our goal to take over governments. *We want merely to live in a country whose government is truly Islamic, and in which Islamic laws shape the reality,*\* for our faith constitutes the highest fortune in life. “The sanctimonious hypocrisy of this statement is truly astounding. If this man was being truthful, why did the Brotherhood engineer an armed uprising in Hama (Syria), which began with the preplanned murder of a number of key government officials and Ba’ath Party members, and attempts to occupy important government buildings? As investigation after the murder of Anwar Sadat showed, over thirty armed radical groups had sprung up after the 1967 war, and each one of them was either actually under the control of a Brotherhood member or was led by a former member, so that in every case, the Brotherhood itself could deny responsibility. A parallel is seen in the ‘fedayeen’ operations of the PLO.

Al-Telmisani does not explain how the dream of living in a truly Islamic country can be realised for every Muslim in the world. Obviously, he would not prescribe mass migration by Muslims from countries which can never be Islamic because the Muslims there are in minority; nor would he encourage migration from countries where the Muslims are in a majority but the government refuses to be Islamic according to the Brotherhood’s definition. This is the situation in which the Brotherhood has chosen the two obvious weapons—subversion from within, and armed uprising as the climax.

---

\*Emphasis Supplied.

### THE MUSLIM SISTERHOOD

The third entity, the Dukhtaran-e-Millat should not be lightly dismissed. As the few survivors of our terrorist days before 1947 would testify, in any underground political and terrorist activity, women, including small female children, can and do play a vital role. Hassan al-Bana founded the Muslim Sisterhood in 1933 in the face of strong opposition from other members of the Brotherhood, who considered the step an infraction of the rules of Islam. It was originally called, according to Dietl, Institute for the Mothers of the Faithful. By 1944, al-Bana managed to have the Sisterhood legitimised by the Brotherhood. Its chairperson, Zeinab al-Ghazali al-Gebeily, was interviewed by Dietl. She stated the basic position of the Sisterhood as follows: “The members of the Muslim Sisterhood are at the heart of the Islamic movement. Together with the Muslim Brotherhood, we should like to teach people the correct Islamic position. Then the women can continue the instruction by themselves in their families and in the entire society.” Asked how far the Sisterhood members would go in their activity, and if this would include participation in a ‘jihad’, she replied: “In every respect. Since the time of the prophets, the women have fought in the medical sector as well as in the realm of nutrition. If it were necessary now, we would also fight with weapons beside the men.” Is it any wonder then that the Dukhtaran-e-Millat carry Kalashnikovs and grenades under their ‘phirans’ and burqas? Strange to recall that one of the charges that the Syrian unit of the Muslim Brotherhood made against the regime of President Hafez al-Assad was that it was seriously violating the prescriptions of Islam by raising girls’ parachute brigade for combat operations—an activity which, it claimed, involved violation of Islamic dress regulations and exposed the young ladies to the danger of ruptured hymens thereby making them liable to instant divorce on the night of ‘entry’! In the Valley, the Dukhtaran-e-Millat constitutes an integral part of the organisation and the operations of the insurgents. Under no circumstances should they be taken lightly or let off because of their sex.

### MODUS OPERANDI

The question now is if the more than three dozen insurgent groups, said to be operating in the Valley are, in fact, different groups espousing different causes and ideologies, with different leaderships and different sponsors and sources of support, or they are all different faces and different limbs of the same parent body. It is a question of understanding the modus operandi of underground terrorist operations.

In any organised terrorist activity, there is an assumption that if a member of an operation squad is apprehended, he will be thoroughly grilled by “hostile” Intelligence. As a rule, such gunmen are never told which organisation, in fact, is sending them out on a “mission”. The “operation leader” briefs the group commander who briefs the men, to make sure that in case of apprehension, the person nabbed says that he belongs to a particular organisation the name of which is invented for that particular action. This is intended as a ruse to confuse the intelligence authorities. Every time a new name crops up, they, as a matter of routine, have to devote time and effort to find out all the relevant information about that group which, in fact, does not exist. Thus the efforts of the intelligence authorities are diluted and diffused uselessly. A picture begins to take shape showing a large number of groups operating independently of one another. This induces the belief that each group can be tackled separately and that dissensions can be created among the groups. Behind this elaborate make-believe aimed at getting the intelligence authorities involved in numerous wild-goose chases, there is the central controlling authority playing the game adroitly, moving the pieces on the board. This strategy became firmly established in the Middle East by 1971-72. It is now seen in operation in the Valley.

Leaving aside for the moment the question of the identity and the location of the “central controlling authority”, it is necessary at this point to answer the question if the different names of the armed groups are purely accidental or if they have some significance or purpose behind them. In order to explore this

mystery, it is necessary to understand the organisational aspect of the insurgency in the Valley, and the way it differs from partisan warfare in the Nazi-occupied areas of the Soviet Union during World war II, and from the Naxalite problem in Andhra Pradesh and Bihar. The similarities with the earlier insurgency problems in Nagaland and Mizoram have also to be noticed.

Unlike the Naxalites in Andhra Pradesh and Bihar, the armed gangs in the Valley have an organisational and operational set-up which allows them a great degree of both safety and flexibility. The recruitment is, of course, from the Valley, but the training centres are located on foreign-held territory. After being trained, armed and launched, they are sure of ready-made bases in the population centres from which they had been recruited. They can carry out their operations from these bases, which act as sources of food, shelter and re-supply. When pressed, they can retreat to their sanctuaries over the Line of Actual Control. They come back when the pressure wanes. Unlike the Naxalites, they are not surrounded completely by "hostile" forces. When they are at these bases, they have legitimate reasons for their presence and it would be impossible to link them with insurgent activity unless weapons, explosives or other incriminating material are found with them, or they are effectively denounced by informers. This is a classic application of the Maoist strategy of hinterland-base-target operation to "liberate" an area. The idea is not entirely new. According to Intelligence sources, the blue-print for such an operation using Bhutan and adjacent areas as the base, and Tibet as the hinterland to carry out a people's liberation war in North Bengal and the north bank of the Brahmaputra, had, in fact, been prepared by a member of the CPI(M) Politburo in the early 1960s.

From the above, it is possible to imagine that the more than three dozen names of insurgent groups encountered in the Valley have a significance and an operational logic behind them. It is not impossible, and, in fact, it is probable, that each name refers to a distinctive 'branch' of a Muslim Brotherhood underground network, with a specific territorial anchorage. The 'usra'

at the bottom level then consists of those who attend prayers at a particular mosque, the point at which Jamaat-e-Islami and the Ikhwan Muslimeen begin to converge. It is not at all necessary that each 'branch' should know every other 'branch'. In other words, it is not necessary at all that each armed group should know that all belong to the same parent outfit; in fact, it is better that they do not. It is necessary that the "enemy" is induced to believe that each group is an independent unit.

The territorial anchorage is a matter of utmost importance to the insurgent activity. It is not at all necessary that in all cases, the terrorists should come across the Line of Actual Control carrying their weapons and entire range of supplies. Those who do so include some who are "expendables" contributing to the build-up of a certain picture. A far more effective method would be to smuggle arms, ammunition, explosives and other supplies separately, by as many different routes as possible—not excluding Jammu—, and leave them with the families who are the safe havens. The actual fighting men can then travel unarmed, and prima facie unsuspected, to their families quite legitimately, and wait for further instructions. This method also provides better means to re-provision the insurgents. Suppose a supply of ammunition intended for Group-X is intercepted. The name of the group is known, but, unless its territorial link is discovered, there is practically no way of knowing which particular spot those supplies were intended to reach. At the same time, the "other side" knows perfectly well where a particular group is to be found.

Another advantage of such territorial anchorage is that the terrorisation of the local population into collaboration, or at least, passive compliance, becomes easier to accomplish. It must be borne in mind at all times and in every situation that the insurgents have not suddenly dropped from Mars or the Moon; they are all known faces in their bases; they are the fathers, sons, husbands or brothers of someone or the other. When half a dozen known faces with guns in hand ask for anything, they almost always manage to get it without any resistance; if they

kill one innocent as a lesson, the hundred others learn very quickly; once they have been there, the “other side” will get no co-operation at all unless total safety can be guaranteed; if the “other side” kills an innocent, even by mistake, in an ineffective use of force, it will create a hundred more enemies. That is the beauty of the situation in the Valley—in many ways reminiscent of Viet-nam, in terms of operational difficulties for our forces. The situation is also reminiscent of the days of communist insurgency in Malaya, if only we have the courage to see how.

Now, if all these groups were truly independent of one another, they would have been at times working at cross-purposes, and there would have been a significant number of fire-fights between and among them, by mistake or by accident or otherwise. The fact that there have not been such incidents, indicates the existence of a point of co-ordination and control. Secondly, if each of the 36-plus groups had independent sponsors, each one of the sponsors would be working independently to provision his group after training and launching it. This would have produced total confusion in the field, and Pakistan, for reasons of internal security alone if not for other reasons, would be compelled to enforce its own control over them all. Thirdly, all the training centres are operated by Pakistan. Indisputably, therefore, Pakistan controls and co-ordinates the activities of all the groups.

It is not impossible that a few of the groups are in fact splinters of others, and taking advantage of the situation, a few others may have been set up by disgruntled local politicians and vested interests to serve their private purposes. This is not unusual at all. Even with all this, the central, inescapable fact is that if three dozen independent organisations procured arms and ammunition independently, had their own supply and communication systems, had their own operational plants and objectives, the result would be total confusion. Further, it is difficult to visualise funds, whatever the sources, pouring into three dozen or more different coffers. Procurement of illicit arms of the latest type is

not difficult if one has the right contacts and the hard currency to pay for it. It is obvious that the insurgents themselves cannot have those contacts nor do they have the hard currency. Therefore, the funding is from a foreign source. It follows that it is either that source of funding or another entity linked with it, which is procuring the arms. Therefore, for all practical purposes, it has to be taken for granted that all the insurgent groups constitute one single force co-ordinated, controlled and directed by one central authority.

### COORDINATION AND CONTROL

Who is that authority? Is it Pakistan? Is it Pakistan in tandem with another entity? Or, is Pakistan only a conduit and an agent? Or, is it the situation that Pakistan's particular motivations have dovetailed into the motivations of some other entity? If so, what is that other entity? To answer these questions, it is necessary to look at some of the consequences of Partition as they have affected the Muslims of this sub-continent. And, this has to be done realistically, without any sentimental haze clouding both vision and judgment. The stakes are too great to permit anything but brutal frankness where it is needed.

The demand for the creation of Pakistan was based on the argument that the Muslims of this "sub-continent" constituted, racially, culturally and confessionally, a nation separate from the Hindus and the rest. The racial argument was, of course, pure nonsense; the cultural argument ignored the gradual and slow but palpable fusion that had been taking place in the countryside of which the urban elite Muslims were largely unaware; that left only the religious argument i.e. that Muslims because they were Muslims were ipso facto a separate nation. It does not seem to have been realised in 1946-47, that this last was a double-edged sword. If Muslims because of being Muslims were a separate nation, there could not be a territorially defined Pakistani nation, and the Muslim community of this "sub-continent" would, by definition and perforce, form only a part of the greater mass of the 'Umma'. This is why Maududi persistently opposed the

concept of nationalism and equated it with egoism in the individual. (“Egoism in individual life is nationalism in the context of social life. A nationalist is usually narrow-minded and stingy.”) That is why he opposed the creation of Pakistan as a nation-state, and urged the interpretation of Partition only as a partial unification of the divided ‘Umma’—only as a step towards the resuscitation of the original ‘Umma.’ This also explains the frequent bouts of trouble that he and his Jamaat had with successive regimes in Pakistan. It is also clear that Maududi’s concept was precisely the same as that of the Muslim Brotherhood as put to Dietl by Omar al-Telmisani. Now that persons steeped in the ideology and the objectives of Jamaat-e-Islami, occupy vital position in the Pakistani hierarchy of power, it has to be taken for granted that Pakistan’s policy and action cannot but be directed by the basic objectives of that organisation.

Where does all this leave the Muslims in our country? Do they still constitute a separate nation? Or, are they as much a part of our nation as anyone else in this country? If these questions are viewed in the light of the principles and the objectives of Jamaat-e-Islami, and of Ikhwan Muslimeen, as well as the theoretical justification for the demand for the creation of Pakistan, the following answers emerge from these principles and objectives. First, the Muslims in India cannot be part of the Indian nation; secondly, they are a separate people forming a part of the Islamic ‘Umma’ which transcends national boundaries; thirdly, as Muslims, they have a right to ‘live Islam’ i.e. they have the right to live only under a strict regime of the Shari’a to the exclusion of laws enacted by the Indian parliament; fourthly, if such a regime administered by an orthodox Muslim authority cannot be guaranteed for them within the Indian Union, they would have the right to constitute for themselves a separate political entity; and, fifthly, as the unification of the entire Islamic ‘Umma’ under a separate Muslim authority is still a matter for the future, they should, as a preliminary step in that larger process, at least be detached from the existing Indian political

authority because the ultimately desirable objective of complete Islamisation of India is a doubtful and distant prospect.

### PSYCHE AND STRATEGY OF PAKISTAN

To the above has to be added certain aspects of the Pakistani psyche which has been shaped since 1947, and which governs Pakistan's policy towards this country. At the same time, it is necessary to bear in mind the fact that this policy has little to do with the so-called will of the people. The dominant factor is the mental attitude of the armed forces, complemented by that of the bureaucracy—both dominated by the Punjabi elite. It is equally necessary to appreciate the fact that this elite has not forgotten Jinnah's lament that he got a "moth-eaten Pakistan". This elite believes that Pakistan ought to have included the whole of Punjab, the whole of Bengal and Assam, a corridor between the two non-contiguous areas, Hyderabad and Kashmir.

All cadets on training in various military establishments in Pakistan are given an intensive course of indoctrination. The contents of this course would gladden the heart of the most die-hard, chauvinist Jamaat-e-Islami instructor. The sum and substance of this indoctrination consists in instilling the conviction that Islam is superior to all other religions, that Muslims by consequence are superior to all others and are destined to rule over the world, that it is the duty of every Muslim to spread the sway of Islam, that a part of this duty is to "liberate" Muslims from infidel rule everywhere, that cowardly Hindus can never win in a battle against Islamic forces, and that glory of Islam and its flag has to be restored on this "sub-continent". The same indoctrination is given to the men by mullahs in even cruder terms.

In 1965, Ayub Khan had learned one lesson: a direct military assault on India was bound to fail, and, therefore, the strategy had to be an indirect one. The most careful preparations were made for an armed uprising in the Valley in 1972 to coincide with the elections to be held that year. That conspiracy was smashed in 1970. The poison plant was uprooted but its seeds

remained in the soil. The Pakistan Army has not forgotten and will never forget the humiliation at Dacca on 16 December 1971; it has become even more determined to have a revenge. The only way this revenge can be sought is through first cutting India down to size by engineering secession of various areas, and then to administer a military coup-de-grace. It is at this particular point that the aims of the Pakistani military establishment coincide with those of Jamaat-e-Islami and Muslim Brotherhood.

Now, how to engineer a successful secessionist operation? It cannot be done simply by supplying arms to groups of desperados and criminals. The target area and the target population have to be carefully selected. That population must be given ideological preparation. It is only after such ideological indoctrination has been firmly carried out and means established for sustaining it that preparation and training for armed insurgency can be undertaken. The fighting cadres have to be carefully chosen, man by man, and a complete system of communication, supplies and safe havens have to be built up. There are, therefore, three elements in the plan: the indoctrination of the population towards Muslim separatism, creation of a fighting force and the actual conduct of the insurgency operations. The task of indoctrination naturally fell to the lot of Jamaat-e-Islami; the underground network bears the hall-mark of Muslim Brotherhood; and, obviously, the military aspect of the operation had to be left to Pakistan, with Pakistan Occupied Kashmir, thanks to our folly, as the classic 'hinterland'.

#### ROLE OF SHEIKH ABDULLAH

The foundation for Muslim separatism in Kashmir was actually laid with the setting up of the Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference in 1932 with Sheikh Abdullah as the president. In its thinking, in its aims and purposes, it was an almost exact replica of the Muslim League in India during its early stages. In 1938-39, the organisation renamed itself as the All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference, and opened its doors to all com-

munities. That was the beginning of a series of fatal errors by the Indian National Congress and by Nehru. Neither appear to have realised the fact that this organisation headed by Sheikh Abdullah was wedded to the very limited objectives of overthrowing Dogra rule without any commitment to the Congress party's struggle against British rule, and without any clear commitment as to what was to follow the end of Dogra rule. Abdullah's opposition to Dogra rule did not mean his intergration into the mainstream of our freedom struggle. This was amply proved by the telegram addressed by the All J&K National Conference to the Cabinet Mission, which said, in part: "As such case of Kashmir stands on unique footing and people of Kashmir press on Mission their unchallengeable claim to freedom on withdrawal of British power from India." Betraying deplorable lack of perspicacity, Nehru and the Congress leadership failed to notice the implications of this plea to the Cabinet Mission. They did not realise that Abdullah was after creating an independent Islamic sheikhdom for himself, and was using the Indian National Congress as a cat's-paw. Thus arose a comic situation in which both Abdullah and Hari Singh were dreaming about an independent Kashmir with the difference that Abdullah's dream excluded Hari Singh, and the latter's excluded Abdullah! Into this mess walked Nehru in May 1946 after Abdullah had been arrested on account of the "Quit Kashmir" call against Dogra rule, and in an empty but dramatic gesture, had himself arrested as well. To any neutral observer, it appeared that Nehru was supporting Abdullah's call to 'jihad': You must fight slavery and enter the field of 'jihad' as soldiers." There is no need here to repeat what followed.

It is incomprehensible even to-day why Nehru decided in 1948 to go to the Security Council when a clear military victory was in sight. If Nehru had bothered to read the Charter of the United Nations he would have realised that the U.N. had no authority to adjudicate on the merits of a dispute: it was only a forum and a facility. Neither the U.N. as a whole, nor the Security Council in particular are competent, under the Charter, to

pronounce themselves on a question of law: yet, we argued the case in the Security Council as if we were the plaintiff before a regular court of law. The second blunder was to send Abdullah to the U.N. The Indian delegation, particularly Sir B.N. Rau, had tried to avoid a speech by Abdullah, but, he was not to be denied his chance to catch the headlines. He addressed the U.N. leaving the Indian delegation aghast and the Pakistanis chortling with glee. Sir Mohd. Zafrulla Khan caught Sir B.N. Rau in the lobby and asked him with a twinkle in his eyes. "Where have you been hiding this jewel so long?" The third and the most inexcusable blunder was to order a cease-fire when we were not in a position of overwhelming advantage. In any case, we should never have contemplated ordering a cease-fire before the enemy was completely thrown out of Kashmir. Fourthly, we should never have agreed to Part-III of the Resolution of August 13, 1948, which gave Pakistan not only a locus standi in respect of the future of Kashmir, but also gave it equality of status with us. The idea of plebiscite was also planted in the same part, and we see to-day the Frankenstein that has grown out of it. The irresistible conclusion is that Nehru and his cronies handled the Kashmir affair at that stage with the most disgraceful lack of foresight and competence. Our jawans, airmen and officers had died in vain.

### HISTORY OF SUBVERSION

Pakistani subversion in Kashmir dates from that time. Behind the apparent capriciousness of Abdullah was the continuing theme of this original dream of an independent Islamic sheikhdom for himself. If a plebiscite could facilitate that end, why not have it—in one form or another? If it is at all possible to get at the facts under the surface of those days, it would most probably be found that the Deoband-trained ulema and religious instructors who had proved to be invaluable allies and cadres of the Muslim League in procuring the often frenzied support of Muslim masses, were engaged in intensive indoctrination activities from every mosque, every maktab, every madrassa, every

institution for instruction in the Qur'an. Without the ground being so prepared in the countryside, and without a serious degree of subversion of the local administrative and intelligence machinery, it would not have been possible for the infiltrators in 1965 to have reached Srinagar without being detected, and readied themselves for enacting a mini-Dienbienphu at Srinagar airport. It was, once again, for the Indian Army and the Indian Air Force to save the situation and the necks of the politicians who had failed signally between 1948 and 1965 to understand what was going on inside Kashmir and act accordingly. The nation ought to be more than grateful to Lal Bahadur Shastri for proving himself—in the words of ordinary Pakistanis—a 'mard' compared to Nehru!

After the all too brief Lal Bahadur interlude, Delhi slid back into the pre-1965 bad habits in Kashmir. Congress and later Congress (I) relapsed into playing the traditional game of coterries and courtiers and the Devil take Kashmir. Delhi learned no lessons from 1965, but Rawalpindi-Islamabad did. Pakistan realised that Jamaat-e-Islami has done good work in ideological subversion and infiltration and of the administration, but that was not enough for engineering a credible internal uprising without which Kashmir could not be detached from India.

It seems that even before 1965, in the highest rungs of the civil service at the Centre, there had grown a kind of distaste, disinclination and disillusionment over the political handling of the Kashmir situation. It is a fact that till his dying day, Nehru retained exclusive control over Kashmir affairs through both the government and the Congress party. There was an insurmountable barrier of exclusion erected by him. At times, this was so exasperating that the ebullient Y.D. Gundevia, as Foreign Secretary, was once heard to exclaim, "You simply cannot talk to P.M. about Kashmir. Mention the word, and the Old Man goes into a trance!" One shudders to think what would have happened if Nehru had been the Prime Minister in 1965.

Pakistan went about carrying out its plans in a determined manner. It is perhaps soon after 1965 that the Muslim Brother-

hood entered the arena with its organisational expertise. The standard time-span for Muslim Brotherhood success-plan was given by the Hassan al-Bana himself: “We need three generations for our plans—one to listen, one to fight, and one to win”. The listening generation had already been created by Jamaat-e-Islami. The Brotherhood had to organise the other two. The Jamaat-e-Islami also has a three generation continuity plan: the old man who teaches, the young man who is taught, and the children born to him. The old man will die, the young man becomes a militant and may get shot, but his children carry on after him taught by the mother who has become a member of the Dukhtaran-e-Millat. These children will grow up and follow their father’s footsteps while their children will ready themselves to take over when the time comes.

Pakistan used the period between 1965 and 1970 to such good effect that by the middle of 1970, over 200 “cells” i.e. usras or squadrons in Muslim Brotherhood terminology, had been established in the Valley alone. They were, of course, discovered and smashed, but, the question is: Did they grow totally unnoticed by the local administration, or did they have the tacit approval if not active collaboration from it? From the course of events of those days, it is quite clear that the latter is the greater possibility if not a certainty. Such a large number of potentially insurgent cells could not have been set up without local intelligence coming to know about them. Did the operatives report what they had come to know, or did they intentionally suppress their knowledge? If the information was, in fact, put into the “proper channel”, did it reach the Chief Secretary and the Governor, or did it get suppressed en route, and if so, by whom? If the Governor and the Chief Secretary were in possession of the information, what did they do with it? Did they take it seriously and follow up with appropriate action, or did they just dismiss it as unnecessary and baseless fear-mongering by the police? Did they apprise the central government of what they had come to know, and, if they did, what did that government do about it before 1970? The same course of events shows that the

central government did have the information all through. What is alarming is that it probably never reached either Prime Minister, Smt. Indira Gandhi, or the Chiefs of Staff. Where did the information get stuck and why? One cannot avoid thinking that there was at that time a person or a lobby, connected with the subversive elements in the Valley, who were in a position to stall action. That this stalling action eventually failed is no reason to think that the evil ceased to exist. For all one knows, it is not only alive but is also kicking lustily these days.

The Pakistani plans for Kashmir, evidently, had not provided for the happenings in Pakistan's eastern wing during 1971. What is not known publicly is that by the middle of that year, CIA had come to the conclusion that there was going to be a Bangladesh, the only question being that of the time-frame; the State Department was of the same opinion, and so was the U.S. embassy in New Delhi; the Pentagon was of the opinion that Pakistan could in no way defend East Pakistan against an Indian intervention to support the internal uprising, and that the USA must not get embroiled in a conflict with India on this account; in the White House, the advice from the National Security Council was to act with extreme caution, and given the inevitable outcome, not to do anything that would irretrievably alienate India. Both Nixon and Kissinger were pragmatists, realists and adroit players of the game of power. By the end of 1972, word had gone out of the White House that India had "arrived", and was to be helped to "build up" if the approach came from the Indian side. All this meant a terrible setback for Pakistan so far as Kashmir was concerned, and this was reflected in the internal politics in Kashmir as played by Abdullah and his allies, known and unknown.

The victory of 1971 had placed in our hands a number of trumps and aces. We played all of them with disgraceful naivete and myopia. The result was seen in the Shimla Agreement of July 3, 1972. It was not a victory for peace. It was not even a proof of the honesty of our intensions regarding Pakistan. It was plainly and simply a straight and abject capitulation to Bhutto's

bluster and the wiles of the Pakistani diplomatists. While we could have used territory as the lever to get Pakistan out of Kashmir forever and thereby facilitate the task of uprooting the poison-weeds from the Valley, we gave up that leverage for nothing, left Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in the lurch, and provided Pakistan with a free entry into Kashmir affairs again. As one of the seniormost Pakistani diplomatists, who was very much involved in negotiating the Shimla Agreement, told a friend, Pakistan had come to Shimla with a carefully thought out game-plan; the sole purpose was to get back the territories lost and the prisoners of war; as for the rest of the Shimla Agreement, it did not mean anything to Pakistan. No wonder, a British diplomatist was heard to say early in 1972 that Pakistan need not feel unduly worried as India will, as usual, give away at the conference table what she won in the war. How right he was!

#### SHEIKH ABDULLAH AGAIN

It is now 20 years since the victory of 1971, and nearly that long from the Shimla Agreement. In the meantime, we have gained nothing but lost a great deal. From January 1972 onwards we should have taken up real clean-up operation in the Valley, but, we did nothing of the sort: we let matters drift. The political bosses in Delhi had learned no lessons since October 1947. Ground realities meant nothing to them, nor did they make any effort to cognise them. And the so-called politicians of Kashmir—of all shapes and hues, not Muslims alone—were busy as usual with their factional squabbles and their demented pre-occupation with the profits of office. No one in Delhi seems to have realised that these men were loyal only to their own pockets. In such a situation, all the information gathered by the central intelligence authorities meant nothing to the bosses of the party ruling at the centre.

It is incomprehensible why with Pakistan soundly beaten in 1971, its infra-structure for insurgency in the Valley almost totally smashed, its internal turmoil assuming ominous proportions, its military establishment thoroughly disgraced before its

people, its size and potential considerably reduced by secession in the east, its faith in Islam as an invincible force rudely shaken, its capacity for doing mischief in Kashmir checkmated at least for the time-being, it was considered necessary and desirable to reach an agreement with Sheikh Abdullah when his duplicity, his positively anti-national attitudes and activities, his penchant for dictatorial and dynastic rule, and his adherence to his original dream were well-known. One wonders who sold the idea to Smt. Indira Gandhi, and why she, with all her shrewdness and astuteness, fell for it. Where Kashmir was concerned, did she after all, suffer from the same infirmities as her father did?

And, the choice of the negotiator was most unfortunate. G. Parthasarathy (allegedly the 'brain' behind our ill-conceived involvement in Sri Lanka's internal affairs) was simply no match for exceedingly wily and devious characters like Abdullah and Mirza Afzal Beg. Three years of negotiations produced the infamous Kashmir Accord of 1975 which, like Arjun Singh's equally infamous Punjab Accord of later date, lasted just about as long as it took the ink to dry. That Accord contained constitutional arrangements which could not be the subject-matter of a private agreement. The thing was totally extra-legal. What it really achieved was the triumphant return of Abdullah to power, and the planners in Islamabad heaved a sigh of relief. From that point onwards, there was no stopping the rapid build-up towards insurgency.

By the time Abdullah died, Jamaat-e-Islami had established virtual control over the entire youth of the Muslim community through its preachers among the teachers; its adherents had placed themselves in all vital positions in the administrative apparatus; it had also gained control over and the adherence of politicians who had used its unabashedly communalist and fundamentalist propaganda set-up for their personal ends. With the state sufficiently insulated from the rest of India by Article 370 (why did the Hindus of Kashmir insist upon a separate Hindu Marriage Act for that state?), Abdullah and his collaborators had

a completely free hand to let the secessionist and terrorist organisations grow apace, particularly after the Resettlement Act of 1975. Meanwhile Delhi slept the slumber of the drugged. This was irresponsibility without bounds.

### FACETS OF DISINFORMATION

When Governor Jagmohan took over in 1984, the malignant tumour of subversion and secession, with the active help of local politicians and administrative personnel and certainly because of denseness and stupidity of the myopic mini-Mughals of Delhi, had metastatically invaded every part of the valley. It was a hopeless and thankless job he had on his hands because the support he needed from the Centre was never forthcoming. A governor cannot function outside the law. He is bound to act through the constitutional machinery designed to assist him in discharging his duties as the executive head of the state government. Jagmohan's great handicap was that this machinery had already become too rotten to be of any use. Even if he got rid of the Council of Ministers and the Legislature, he was not a free agent, for he then became even more dependent on Delhi. He could not have any effective force at his disposal unless Delhi chose to make it available. He could not even look into the quality and the quantity of the work of the central intelligence agencies functioning within his jurisdiction. If they chose to withhold information from him, there was nothing that he could do about it. Delhi's attitude can be summed up as: "If the governor achieves something we shall take the credit; if he fails, he will be to blame. We shall let him be so long as he does not interfere with our little parlour games of coterie politics. "Governor Jagmohan is on record as having sent enough warning signals to Delhi from early 1988 onwards. Why were they ignored? On whose advice did Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi ignore them? Therein lies the clue to the disgraceful record of the central government with respect to Kashmir.

Those who planned the insurgency in the Valley knew it, and those who are conducting it now know it as well, that one of

the preconditions of success is to prevent effective anti-insurgency action—political and physical—from being taken by the central government. This end is achieved through the spread of disinformation, and the planting of certain ideas at the “right” places. Disinformation consists mainly of concoctions about alleged “atrocities” by the security forces, which the sensation-loving media and starry-eyed fools simply lap up, and over which so-called civil rights activities start shaking their fingers. The ideas have one aim: undercut the governor who wants to and does take tough action against the insurgents. For example, when Governor Jagmohan was sent to Kashmir for the second time, ideas were planted at the right places suggesting that there were sensible “political elements” who would be willing to negotiate; and that many of the armed youngsters were merely misguided people and could be brought back to the path of reason. Result? Observe Mr. George Fernandes getting into the act—achieving nothing but undoing what Governor Jagmohan was trying to do. The second idea is that the youth in the Valley have taken to arms because of joblessness and economic neglect. If joblessness was sufficient reason for an armed uprising, the whole of this country ought to be engulfed by insurgency. If economic neglect was the reason, one can visualise a number of areas which would be up in arms. Yet, the idea induces politicians of various hues to talk about development programmes—and, of course, more subsidies—for the Valley as the only solution for the problem. The third notion is that any tough action against Muslim insurgents will hurt Muslim sentiments in the rest of the country. This idea, effectively whispered into the right ears, is the most potent weapon to use with Congress (I) politicians whose fear of losing Muslim votes puts them into a mood of abject surrender to blackmail. The argument is, of course, baseless. Pakistan was thrashed in 1971, but Smt. Gandhi scored a resounding electoral victory in 1972. Which way did the Muslims vote then? So far, the tactic of prevention of action has worked quite well. It could not have done so, unless there was somewhere near the centre of power an exten-

sion of the chain of command through which the insurgents are deployed and used.

### FOCUS OF SABOTAGE

This “extension”, this focus of sabotage, is nothing new. It has existed since 1947. Pakistan has merely located it, penetrated it and come to a deal with it. Its purpose originally was to ensure that Kashmir remained as separate from India in constitutional dispositions as was possible with a view to a future bid for independence. In course of time, its composition naturally changed, but its purposes remained the same as before. Its position was immensely strengthened by the policy of appeasement of Muslims pursued by Congress (I). If the history of Kashmir since 1947 is seen in parallel with the histories of Nagaland and Mizoram, one immediately becomes aware of a significant difference in the attitude adopted by the central government towards Kashmir as compared to that towards Nagaland and Mizoram. The Naga insurgents were called that name and also described as “hostiles”, so were the Mizo insurgents. In the case of Kashmir, no one has ever heard the government use either of these two words. Why?

The answer is simple: the insurgents in the Valley are Muslims, the Naga and Mizo insurgents were not. This is the reason why the Army has been deployed against ULFA in Assam, but, our benighted Home Minister goes to Srinagar and declares that the Army will not be deployed in the Valley against the insurgents. This is a combination of utter stupidity, total confusion and paralysing indecisiveness. History shows that Congress (I) has an unbroken record of giving an unlimited licence to Muslim separatism in the Valley since 1947. The Pakistanis, the Jamaat-e-Islami and the Muslim Brotherhood and their allies in this country would be blithering idiots if they did not take full advantage of this fatal weakness of the Congress (I). (The witch-hunting Janata Party government of 1977-79 which was even more incoherent, and the nine-month V.P. Singh circus do not count). In actual fact, they so correctly

judged the cowardice of our politicians that they felt bold enough to open a Second Front in the East at about the same time in 1988 as when Governor Jagmohan was sending warning signals from Srinagar.

### SECOND FRONT IN THE EAST

A steady stream of Muslim infiltration into Assam has been going on since the days of Mohd. Saadullah. Both Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed and Moinul Haq Chaudhury had encouraged the trend. By the early 1960s these infiltrators had spread even into Darrang and Nowgong districts as well as Goalpara. By 1980, they had reached Manipur. On the other side, a steady stream of Hindu refugees had been coming over into the border districts of West Bengal. Some Muslims, generally belonging to divided families did also come in. The Hindu traffic spurted up when Bangladesh was declared an Islamic republic. It should be borne in mind that the entire indo-Bangladesh border is riddled with a network of smuggling, which facilitates illicit cross-border traffic as well as infiltration by undesirables.

Jamaat-e-Islami has been functioning as an organised party in Bangladesh since before 1971. During 1971, it had collaborated with Pakistan. Although it never showed much electoral clout, it gained considerable influence and leverage using the same tactics as in the West, i.e. what is Pakistan to-day. As if on a pre-arranged signal, Jamaat started sending its well-trained mullahs into West Bengal sometime in 1988. To-date, some 7000 of them are said to be firmly ensconced in the mosques. In the East, there was no Abdullah to push through a Resettlement Act to facilitate the import of trained militants from Pakistan. Therefore, Jamaat-e-Islami chose the method of infiltration. The point to note is that the areas where these mullahs have gone are also heavily populated by Hindu migrants. This fact makes Jamaat's plans perfectly clear, and unless the people and the authorities concerned wake up to this menace in the time and take the toughest possible steps to nip the danger in the bud, communal peace in West Bengal is likely to be shattered much sooner than one thinks.

The Jamaat's plan appears to be first, to prepare the existing population ideologically together with organising a rapidly increasing illicit Muslim immigration from Bangladesh into the adjoining Indian districts, and secondly, to create a condition of total anarchy in those districts through engineering communal riots when Muslims in those districts have achieved either majority or parity. This will facilitate two things: the expulsion of the remaining Hindus from Bangladesh, and the encouragement of separatism in those districts. It is not impossible that Jamaat has plans to link up with ULFA in Assam and the Gorkhaland agitators in West Bengal purely as a tactical alliance. The danger may to-day look like a fist-size cloud on the horizon, but, it may herald a tempest much sooner than one thinks. It would be suicidal to ignore it. A look at the map will suffice to drive home this point.

The timing of the Jamaat push in the East ought to be regarded as clear proof of a co-ordinated pincer move against our territorial integrity and the unity of our nation. As both arms of the pincer become more and more menacing and increasingly successful on the ground, a great communal chasm is expected to open wide and create an unbridgeable rift within our body politic. That will mean the final destruction of this country. This is the inevitable result of the idiocy, vacillation, pusillanimity and incoherence of our policy regarding Kashmir right from 1947.

#### THE CENTRES OF CONSPIRACY

It is also amply clear that such a gigantic operation aimed at destroying us could not have been masterminded by a few obscurantist and chauvinist mullahs. It is perhaps not even the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) directorate of Pakistan working alone, nor is it the Ikhwan Muslimeen working on its own. There must be a centre of over-all command and control somewhere. It may not be in Pakistan at all. It should surprise no one if that centre, the real brain behind the international conspiracy against us, is located in an apparently innocuous institution like the Islamic Foundation in Leicester, England, which was set up

in 1973 by Prof. Khurshid Ahmed of Pakistan, who succeeded Maududi as the chief ideologue of the Jammāt-e-Islami. It may not have any 'Ops Room' or 'War Room'. It perhaps merely serves as the meeting place for the chief conspirators and their contacts, and in true Muslim Brotherhood style, instructions are sent out through couriers without the recipient knowing from where they have come. He knows only the person.

It would be a dangerous mistake to think that these instructions are sent only to Islamabad or Dhaka. They come to Delhi as well. For the successful continuation of the insurgency in the Valley it is imperative to know what our government plans to do, and to make sure that it does not do what, obviously, has to be done, and, if possible, it is induced to do exactly what ought not to be done. Therefore, there must be a channel of communication between the command and control centre abroad and a certain point in this country. Have we made any attempt to locate and identify this point?

This raises the larger question of how the insurgents communicate with their masters outside. Do they use radio communication sets? Do they use cellular telephones with ranges up to 300 km? Do they use couriers only? Then how do Radio Pakistan and Pakistan Television manage to broadcast news of incidents within a few hours of their occurrence—as there have been instances—long before AIR or Doordarshan has any inkling? Is there then a link from Point X in the Valley to Point Y in Delhi, and thence to Point Z abroad and to Islamabad? Is it not technically possible to carry on a low amplitude Morse transmission in the same band as an ordinary newscast at the same time or a frequency sufficiently close to it to be almost undetectable? And, what has the central government done to cut off these lines of communication? Nothing that is known to anybody. Is it, after all, the fact that although it publicly blames Pakistan for instigating the insurgency, privately, it thinks—or has been induced to think—that the insurgency in the Valley is essentially a local phenomenon, and what Pakistan has succeeded in doing is to misguide the youth into

wrong ways? Otherwise, what explanation can there be for the Home Minister—apparently with a sound mind in a sound body—to offer to negotiate with the insurgents “without pre-conditions”? Did he understand what he was doing and saying? Was he not giving legitimacy to the insurgents, the traitors? Naturally, he received a resounding and well-deserved slap in reply when those gangs refused to talk within the framework of the constitution.

### THE BIGGEST FRAUD

The biggest fraud on us perpetrated by both politicians and an assortment of other fools and knaves is the persistent attempt to sell the myth that the insurgents in the Valley are “misguided youth”. Only an imbecile will describe them as such, and, only a bigger imbecile will imagine that there are among these, young men who have been forced to become insurgents and are not really willing to be so. In any organised insurgency, there is no place for the weakling, the unwilling and the undependable. Insurgency cannot last unless every insurgent is dedicated to the objective to the total exclusion of all other alternatives, and is willing to bear any hardship, any pain and suffering for the cause, and is willing to die for it without a second thought. Motivation and dedication are the foundation of insurgency. Those who talk about the outlaws in the Valley being “misguided”, are totally unaware of the degree of frenzied dedication and dementia that fundamentalist Islamic indoctrination can produce. It is shamefully true that the spineless behaviour of the central government has emboldened the insurgents to indulge in greater and greater outrages without fear of retribution, and strengthened their determination.

It is not known what insights into the degree of motivation of these insurgents, and into the make-up of their minds the authorities gained from interrogating the insurgents they have managed to nab. Did they try to go beyond the objective of ferreting out more information about the physical details? Were they or are they aware how a sensitive and painstaking as well as

highly intelligent effort to go into the minds of young Naxalites proved to be of invaluable help to the West Bengal Police in combatting that menace? If they tried they would have found out exactly what Saad ed-Din Ibrahim, Professor of Sociology found from interviewing 34 fundamentalist terrorists in Egyptian prisons. All of them were in the age-group 17-26, and were totally gripped by the militant Islamic idea. Two-thirds of them were from rural districts and were sons of government employees. They were not all despairing, nor did they feel uprooted. On the contrary, they were deeply motivated and well-trained, particularly the students among them. They shared a feeling of solidarity; their organisation provided them with a feeling of warmth; and their firm faith in their cause moved them forward.\* Insurgents in the Valley are “misguided youth”? Can there be greater nonsense?

In its desperate effort to exculpate itself by blaming Pakistan for all our ills, the government can be expected to miss the very much bigger and profounder aspect of the affair. Has it ever tried to ask the question why India should be made the target of the Islamic conspiracy? It is probably incapable of comprehending the magnitude of the overall threat. Which country in the world has the largest Muslim population? It is Indonesia. There, the Masjumi Party had tried to Islamise the country immediately after its independence. It failed. Islamic fundamentalism had to bow to the superior cultural strength and the spirit of nationalism of Indonesian people. Their Muslim president fought a bitter and bloody war against Muslim insurgents and suppressed them. Where an internationally distinguished Muslim can openly proclaim, “Islam is my religion, but, Ramayana is my culture,” there is no place for fundamentalism—Islamic or otherwise.

The failure in Indonesia, and Ramayana rankled in the minds of the Muslim Brotherhood and Jamaat leadership. They were not bothered about Pakistan which was already in law an Islamic republic, nor later about Bangladesh which they thought could be thoroughly Islamised with the help of petrodollars. The

\*Source: Dielt.

challenge to them was India. So long as India continue to survive and progress as a united, democratic and secular nation which includes a Muslim population of perhaps 85 million, it is a living and increasingly powerful repudiation, refutation and contradiction of the concepts of Jamaat-e-Islami and the Muslim Brotherhood about the integral, supra-national, trans-national and transcendental Islamic 'Umma'. That way, the existence of India makes nonsense of their ideologies. Therefore, India has to be broken up. The fundamentalists failed in Indonesia because Abdul Rehman Sukarno, inspite of his many faults, was a man of steel, leading a united and resurgent nation, proud of its heritage. They hope to succeed in India because those in power are men of straw, terrified of the ghosts and goblins they themselves conjure up.

#### BETRAYAL BEHIND THE BATTLELINE

If they were note so, what is the reason, the explanation, the justification for the Prime Minister confessing that all that he can do is to go on pleading with Pakistan not to interfere in our internal affairs? Does he believe that Pakistan can be pleaded out of its blatant and bold meddling in our affairs when we have given it what amounts to an irrevocable licence to do so? Does he really believe that having gone so far as it already has, Pakistan can suddenly desist without its rulers facing public disgrace and inviting internal turmoil? Does he realise that for Pakistan, the situation in the Valley is almost that of the tail wagging the dog? Does he realise that Pakistan has no choice but to go on with its venture till whatever is the end? Does he have any idea of what the fall-out will be if Pakistan manages to detach at least the Valley? Does he understand that the inevitable consequence in that case will be loss of the whole of Kashmir, the secession of Punjab, the falling away of the border districts of Rajasthan, and an uncontrollable conflagration in the whole of the East and the North-east presaging the destruction of our polity altogether? Is he preparing us for the eventuality of hundreds of "Little Pakistans" dotting the country as Chaudhuri Rahmat Ali had

proposed to Jinnah? And, has he any idea of the damage he is doing to our armed forces with his spineless, weak-kneed stance? Why can he not stand up and say, "They shall not win"?

Imagine our brave men and officers in the lonely pickets from Pir Panjal to the icy wastes of Siachen and beyond, a rifle shot away from an implacable enemy. It is a bleak existence which requires of them the ultimate in courage and fortitude, in vigilance and alertness, an indomitable will and total conviction of victory in the end. Imagine our fliers sweeping the silent skies over a desolate landscape, like lonely eagles hovering above, ever vigilant to notice the slightest movement below, the slightest intrusion into the airspace that is ours and ours alone. In the end what sustains them is the thought that a united nation stands behind them, and the government is doing exactly what is needed to ensure victory.

What our leaders must not forget is that the soldier of to-day is not the illiterate cannon-fodder of yesteryears, nor are the officers scions of an insulated aristocracy. They come from those strata of society which are acutely aware of the realities of life. They read, they think, they listen to the radio, and on the front-line they listen to broadcasts from both sides. They cannot be deceived about what is happening around them and behind them. In those outposts 4000 metres above the sea level, in the eerie calm that only mountains can have, in the sentimental hours of the dawn and the dusk, a man's only companions are his intimate thoughts. When such thoughts are weighed down by the knowledge that while he is there, committed to go beyond the call of duty, things are crumbling in his rear, first there is depression which is soon followed by a sense of desolation, despair and of being abandoned. Then his morale begins to weaken, his alertness and vigilance begin to slacken, his aggressive spirit begins to decline, and in the end, what he had proudly undertaken as his duty begins to feel like an unending, meaningless chore. Then we no longer have a fighting force, but a collection of ceremonial sentries. Thus are armed forces destroyed from within by inept and cowardly political leadership. The nation should thank

its stars for the exemplary discipline and patriotism of our armed forces and their unquestionable commitment to our democratic order, which have so far obviated any possibility of trouble.

It is not that the Battle of the Valley cannot be won. It can be, but, only if our rulers can muster up enough courage and determination and the will to win regardless of how many of the old oligarchy have to be sacrificed. The first and the most important thing they have to do is to stop thinking of the insurgents as Muslims, and to treat them only as traitors and outlaws who must be eliminated together with their ideologues and those who aid and abet them. There is no other choice. For our survival as a democratic and secular nation, it is imperative that we vanquish and disperse the forces of militant fundamentalist Islam once for all. In this war, there is no room for mercy or compassion.

The agony in the valley would not have been a matter of such shame had our rulers not steadily heaped so much disgrace upon us.

## SOME RELEVANT PUBLICATIONS

- History versus Casuistry** (Evidence of the Ramajanmabhoomi Mandir presented by the Vishva Hindu Parishad to the Government of India in December-January, 1990-91)
- Ayodhya and After : Issues Before Hindu Society**  
by Koenraad Elst
- Hindu Temples: What Happened to Them (The Islamic Evidence)**  
by Sita Ram Goel
- The Goa Inquisition**  
by A.K. Priolkar
- The Myth of Saint Thomas and the Mylapore Shiva Temple**  
by Ishwar Sharan
- Indian Muslims : Who Are They**  
by K.S. Lal
- Ram Janmabhoomi Vs. Babri Masjid : A Case Study in Hindu-Muslim Conflict**  
by Koenraad Elst
- Hindu Temples: What Happened to Them (A Preliminary Survey)**  
by Arun Shourie, Harsh Narain, Jay Dubashi, Ram Swarup, Sita Ram Goel
- History of Hindu-Christian Encounters**  
by Sita Ram Goel
- Mohammed and the Rise of Islam**  
by D.S. Margoliouth
- The Word As Revelation : Names of Gods**  
by Ram Swarup
- Politics of Conversion**  
edited by Devendra Swarup
- The Calcutta Quran Petition By Chandmal Chopra**  
with prefaces by Sita Ram Goel
- Catholic Ashrams: Adopting and Adapting Hindu Dharma**  
with a preface by Sita Ram Goel
- Papacy: Its Doctrine and History**  
by Sita Ram Goel
- Inner Yoga (Antaryoga)**  
by Anirvan

VOICE OF INDIA  
NEW DELHI

Rs. 15